Essays on Contests Design with Stochastic Entry and Information Disclosure by JIAO QIAN
  
ESSAYS ON CONTESTS DESIGN WITH 





(B.S. & B.A. 2006, Wuhan University; 






A THESIS SUBMITTED  
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF 
PHILOSOPHY 
  
DAPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 







This dissertation would not have been possible without the assistance of colleagues, 
teachers, and friends, and the inspiration of family. To them, I owe an enormous debt 
of gratitude, and I am grateful to all of them.  
First I want to thank my supervisor Jingfeng Lu for all his support and inspiration. 
My work has benefitted enormously from his comments and critique. I believe that 
his passion, perseverance and wisdom in pursuit of the truth in science, his rigorous 
scholarship as well as his integrity, extraordinary patience and unflinching 
encouragement in guiding students will continue to inspire me for a long time to 
come. I am truly privileged to be supervised by him. 
I would like to thank my committee members, Professor Qiang Fu, Professor 
Parimal Bag, Professor Julian Wright, who spent their valuable time providing me 
with insightful feedback and support. All of them are very encouraging, patient, 
gracious, and helpful to my research as well as job market. Special thanks must be 
given to Professor Qiang Fu who has helped me develop my research ideas and 
supervised me throughout my doctoral studies, he gave valuable advice and great 
help when I was in difficulty, and provided all his possible support during my job 
hunting. 
The same level of appreciation also goes to Professor Bharat Hazari, who provided 
me with the confidence to pursue a PhD degree during my Master program in Hong 
Kong, and is always so concerned about my welfare.  
ii 
 
I would also like to thank my office mates and great friends: Yew Siew Ling, Li Bei, 
Nona May Donguila Pepito, Li Jingping, Qian Neng, Lu Yunfeng, Zhang Yongchao, 
Zheng Hanxiong, Gong Jie and many others, for the discussions we had and for the 
good time together. 
I am grateful to Graduate Research Seminars participants at National University of 
Singapore and participants of 2010 SAET Conference in Singapore, 2010 Inaugural 
Conference of Chinese Game Theory and Experimental Economics Association in 
China, 2011 International Conference on Contests, Tournaments and Relative 
Performance Evaluation in Raleigh and 2012 American Economic Association 
Annual Meeting in Chicago for helpful comments and suggestions. The travel 
support for paper presentation was received from the Division of Research and 
Graduate Studies of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, at National University 
of Singapore. 
I am deeply indebted to my family. Their tremendous love and faith in me have 











Table of Contents 
Acknowledgment ......................................................................................................... i 
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................... iii 
Summary ................................................................................................................... vii 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................ ix 
Chapter One: On Disclosure Policy in Contests with Stochastic Entry ............... 1 
1. Introduction  ....................................................................................................... 1 
2. Contest with A Stochastic Number of Contestants ............................................ 4 
2.1 Equilibrium ..................................................................................................... 5 
2.1.1 Concave Impact Functions ................................................................... 6 
2.1.2 Convex Impact Functions ..................................................................... 9 
2.2 Optimal Disclosure Policy ............................................................................ 11 
3. Extensions and Discussion ............................................................................... 14 
3.1  Imperfect Information Disclosure ............................................................... 14 
3.2 Commitment of Disclosure Policy ............................................................... 17 
4. Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................ 19 
Chapter Two: Contests with Endogenous and Stochastic Entry......................... 20 
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 20 
2. Relation to Literature ....................................................................................... 24 
iv 
 
2.1 Contests ........................................................................................................ 25 
2.2 Auctions with Stochastic Entry .................................................................... 28 
3. Model and Analysis .......................................................................................... 29 
3.1 Setup ............................................................................................................. 29 
3.1.1 Winner Selection Mechanism ............................................................. 29 
3.1.2 Entry ................................................................................................... 30 
3.1.3 Some Preliminaries ............................................................................. 31 
3.2 Existence of Symmetric Equilibrium ........................................................... 32 
3.3 Existence of Equilibrium with Pure-Strategy Bidding ................................. 34 
4. Contest Design ................................................................................................. 40 
4.1 Optimal Accuracy: Choice of r ..................................................................... 40 
4.1.1 Optimum ............................................................................................. 41 
4.1.2 Discussion ........................................................................................... 45 
4.2 Efficient Exclusion ....................................................................................... 48 
4.3 Disclosure Policy .......................................................................................... 50 
4.3.1 Equilibrium When N is Disclosed ...................................................... 51 
4.3.2 Optimal Disclosure Policy under Pure-Strategy Bidding ................... 52 
4.3.3 A Broader Perspective: Mechanism Design ....................................... 54 
5. Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................ 55 
Chapter Three: Disclosure Policy in Contests with Stochastic Abilities ............ 57 
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 57 
2. A Model with unique prize ...................................................................................... 61 
2.1 Disclosure .............................................................................................................. 61 
v 
 
2.2 Concealment ................................................................................................. 63 
2.3 Optimal disclosure policy ............................................................................. 65 
3. Multi-prize contests .......................................................................................... 67 
3.1 Disclosure ..................................................................................................... 67 
3.2 Concealment ................................................................................................. 70 
3.3 Optimal disclosure policy ............................................................................. 71 
3.4 Payoff equivalent .......................................................................................... 72 
3.4.1 Payoff under disclosure ...................................................................... 72 
3.4.2 Payoff under concealment .................................................................. 73 
4. Endogenous distribution of abilities ................................................................. 74 
4.1 Disclosure ..................................................................................................... 75 
4.2 Concealment ................................................................................................. 76 
4.3 Comparison................................................................................................... 77 
4.4 An example ................................................................................................... 78 
5. Endogenous entry ............................................................................................. 81 
5.1 Disclosure ..................................................................................................... 81 
5.2 Concealment ................................................................................................. 82 
5.3 Comparison................................................................................................... 83 
6. Contests with nonlinear cost ............................................................................ 84 
6.1 Disclosure ..................................................................................................... 84 
6.2 Concealment ................................................................................................. 85 
vi 
 
6.3 Optimal disclosure policy ............................................................................. 86 
7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 88 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 90 
Appendix A ............................................................................................................... 97 
Appendix B ............................................................................................................. 102 


















My dissertation contains three essays on optimal contests design with stochastic 
entry and information disclosure. 
The first two chapters study imperfectly discriminatory contests with stochastic 
entries. As much of the contest literature assumes the number of competing agents is 
fixed, and this number is known by all participants. While economic activities 
always involve an uncertain set of participants.  Under the assumption that a fixed 
pool of potential bidders can enter a contest to compete for an indivisible prize, 
chapter 1 explores how a contest organizer who seeks to maximize participant effort 
should disclose the information on the actual number of contestants, when each 
potential contestant has a fixed probability of entering the contest. In a setting with 
risk neutral contestants, the optimal disclosure policy depends crucially on the 
properties of the characteristic function       '/ ffH , where  f  is the impact 
function. The contest organizer prefers full disclosure (full concealment) if  H  is 
strictly concave (strictly convex). However, the expected equilibrium effort is 
independent of the prevailing information disclosure policy if a linear  H  (Tullock 
Contest) applies. 
Chapter 2 differs from chapter 1 in the sense that the probability of entry is 
endogenous. Each bidder incurs an irreversible fixed cost if he decides to enter. After 
entering, the bidders then bid for the prize. This setting leads to a two-dimensional 
discontinuous game (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986). I establish that a symmetric 
equilibrium exists in the entry-bidding game, where all potential bidders enter with a 
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probability. I further identify the conditions for the existence (non-existence) of a 
symmetric equilibrium with pure-strategy bidding after entry. Based on the 
equilibrium result, three main issues about optimal contest design are explored: (i) 
the optimal level of accuracy of the winner selection mechanism (the proper size of r 
in Tullock contests); (ii) the efficiency implications of shortlisting and exclusion; 
and (iii) the optimal disclosure policy. 
Chapter 3 investigates information disclosure in a perfectly discriminating contest. 
Early contributions assume that a player’s ability, measured by his cost of expending 
effort, is fixed and common knowledge. While empirically, contestants usually do 
not know the actual abilities of their rival at the time they make their decision. In 
chapter 3, I assume the private abilities of the contestants are stochastic and they are 
observed by the contest organizer who decides whether to disclose this information 
publicly. The organizer may care about total effort or rent dissipation. I find that 
concealing the abilities of the contestants elicits higher expected total effort, 
regardless of the distribution of the abilities. By way of contrast, rent dissipation rate 
does not depend on the disclosure policy. This finding is robust in a setting with 
multiple prizes as long as effort cost function is linear. And also robust in 
generalized settings with endogenous distribution of abilities and endogenous entry 
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On Disclosure Policy in Contests with
Stochastic Entry
1 Introduction
Much of the contest literature makes the assumption that the number of compet-
ing agents is xed, and that this number is known by all participants. Although
this paradigm simplies the analysis signicantly, it stands in contrast to numer-
ous contest settings in real-life that involve an uncertain set of participants. For
instance, a rm racing to develop an innovation may not know how many other
rms are pursuing the same idea. Similarly, a job applicant may be uncertain
about the number of competitors for the same post. In a procurement tourna-
ment, a seller may not be aware of the number of bidders who are interested in
the contract.
In this study, we study contests with a stochastic number of contestants. Our
basic setting involves a xed number of potential contestants, each of whom has
a xed probability of entering the contest. The realized number of participants
remains uncertain, but follows a binomial distribution. The participating con-
testants exert costly and nonrefundable e¤orts to compete for a single prize. We
further assume that their e¤ort accrues to the benet of the contest organizer.
In this scenario, our analysis sets out to address a classical question in the con-
test literature: How does the contest organizer choose a disclosure policy that
1
maximizes the expected total e¤ort? That is, should the contest organizer dis-
close or conceal the actual number of contestants to participants? Which policy
alternative leads to a higher level of expected total e¤ort?
To address these questions, we consider a three-stage game. In the rst stage,
the contest organizer chooses her disclosure policy. She either reveals the actual
number of contestants, or conceals this information. She announces her policy
choice publicly to potential contestants. In the second stage, the actual number of
contestants is realized and learnt by the organizer. This information is disclosed
to the contestants if the organizer had earlier chosen to do so. In the third
stage, contestants submit their e¤ort entries simultaneously in competition for
the single prize.
We adopt the well-studied ratio-form contest success function to abstract
the underlying stochastic winner selection process.1 In this setting, a contes-





if there are N   1 others who exert e¤ort of x i = (x1; x2; :::xi 1;
xi+1; :::; xN). The function f() has been named the impact function by
Wärneryd (2001), and it species each contestants production technology in the
contest.
The optimal disclosure policy depends crucially on the characteristic function
of the contest, which is formally dened as H(x)  f(x)
f 0(x) . The properties of
this function determine how each participating contestant responds to various
environmental factors in the contest. We show that disclosing the actual number
of contestants leads to a higher (lower) level of total e¤ort, relative to concealing
the information, if the characteristic function is concave (convex). However, the
level of expected total e¤ort is independent of the prevailing disclosure policy, if
the characteristic function is linear. We further show that a linear characteristic
function is uniquely generated by contests known as Tullock (1980) contests,
1The reader is referred to Skaperdas (1996) for the axiomatic foundation of the ratio-form
contest success function and Fu and Lu (2008) for the functions micro-foundation that is
derived from a noisy-ranking perspective.
2
which assume f(x) = xr.
Our analysis yields interesting theoretical implications. Despite all contestants
being risk-neutral, a strictly concave characteristic function leads contestants to
behave as if they were risk-loving when they supply their e¤ort.2 Conversely,
pseudorisk-aversion appears when a strictly convex characteristic function ap-
plies. With non-Tullock contest technologies, the disclosure policy plays a pivotal
role in determining the equilibrium level of e¤ort, because of the pseudorisk-
loving/averse attitudes that are underpinned by concave/convex characteristic
functions.
To check the robustness of our main results and to deepen our analysis, we
further generalize our basic setting by allowing the contest organizer to partially
disclose the actual number of participants. Under a partial disclosure policy,
the organizer does not reveal the exact number of participants, but only the
range of this number. Will the organizer benet from partial disclosure? How
should she structure the optimal partial disclosure policy? We show that strict
concavity (convexity) of the characteristic function must lead to full disclosure
(full concealment), and partial disclosure is never optimal. By way of contrast,
the disclosure policy does not a¤ect the expected overall e¤ort in a Tullock contest
(which has a linear characteristic function), in spite of the numerous possible ways
of constructing a partial disclosure policy.
Only a handful of papers have formally investigated contests with stochastic
participation. Higgins, Shughart, and Tollison (1985) pioneered this strand of
literature by studying a contest in which each rent seeker bears a xed cost for
participation. They established a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium,
where each rent seeker randomly enters the contest, and ends up with zero sur-
plus. While Higgins, Shughart and Tollison (1985) investigated endogenous entry
strategies, a few other studies have assumed exogenous entry patterns. Myerson
and Wärneryd (2006) examined a contest with an innite number of potential en-
2In other words, the individual e¤ort function is convex in terms of the amount of prize.
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trants. Both Münster (2006) and Lim and Matros (2009) assumed a nite pool
of potential contestants. In their setting, each participating contestant enters
the contest with a xed and independent probability and the number of partic-
ipating contestants follows a binomial distribution. Münster (2006) focused on
the impact of playersrisk attitudes on the contestantsincentive to supply ef-
fort. In contrast, Lim and Matros (2009) considered a scenario with risk-neutral
contestants.
The current study is most closely related to Lim and Matros (2009), who
provide a complete account of the bidding equilibrium in a Tullock contest with a
stochastic number of contestants. To the best of our knowledge, Lim and Matros
(2009) are the rst to study optimal disclosure policies in contests. They establish
that the disclosure policy (full disclosure or full concealment) does not impact
the level of e¤ort. Our analysis allows for more general contest technologies,
and we nd sharply di¤erent results that indicate the relevanceof disclosure
policy when non-Tullock contests are considered. Furthermore, we allow contest
organizers to partially disclose information. The disclosure irrelevanceprinciple
in Tullock contests (with their linear characteristic functions) holds, despite the
substantially richer set of candidate disclosure strategies available to organizers.
Our study thus complements Lim and Matros (2009) in these regards.
2 Contest with A Stochastic Number of Con-
testants
LetM( 2) denote the set of risk neutral potential contestants whose probability
of participating in the contest is q 2 (0; 1). All participating contestants compete
for a single prize of value v > 0.
Suppose that N  M contestants participate and simultaneously commit to
their nonnegative rent seeking e¤orts xi; i = 1; 2; :::; N . The e¤ort is costly and
4
non-refundable, and the contestants incur a unit marginal cost. We assume also
that the winner is determined by a ratio-form contest success function. This
mechanism has been commonly adopted in the literature, and is axiomatized
by Skaperdas (1996). If N  2 contestants enter the contest, a participating





where the function f () is strictly increasing, thrice di¤erentiable and weakly
log concave, with f(0) = 0. The log-concavity, as will be shown, guarantees the
uniquness of equilibrium in the contest. Wärneryd (2001) names f () the impact
function of the contest, which indicates a contestants production technology. If
all contestants make zero e¤ort, we assume that the prize recipient is randomly
chosen from the pool. Moreover, we assume that if there is only one participant,
then he automatically wins the prize regardless of his e¤ort.
We assume further that the e¤ort exerted by the contestants accrues to the
benet of the contest organizer. The contest organizer is allowed to commit
to her disclosure policy - either to disclose the actual number of participants,
or to conceal this information - and announces this policy choice publicly. We
denote the former policy by D, and the latter by C. Nature then determines N ,
the actual number of participants. The organizer observes this information, and
discloses it if and only if she has committed to a disclosure. The participants
then submit their e¤ort entry simultaneously x = (xi) to compete for the prize.
2.1 Equilibrium
We now explore the equilibrium of the contest under each policy. We rst consider
a case where the impact function of f() is concave, where a unique equilibrium
is readily established. We next study convex impact functions and we show that
the contest may still yield a unique symmetric equilibrium.
5
2.1.1 Concave Impact Functions
Concave impact functions provide a stronger condition than weak log-concavity.
It is well known that a concave impact function f () is su¢ cient for the existence
and uniqueness of symmetric equilibria in a standard contests. We will show that
this condition guarantees the existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibria
in our context regardless of the prevailing disclosure policy.
Contest with Disclosure We rst consider the subgame where the contest
organizer commits to the policy D. All contestants learn of N before they decide
on their e¤ort level. Each contestant i then rationally chooses his e¤ort xi to
maximize the expected payo¤
i = pi(xi;x i;N)v   xi: (1.2)
Consider a subgame where N contestants participate. We now solve for the
symmetric equilibrium of the contest. Dene H(x)  f(x)
f 0(x) . As shown below,
the equilibrium behavior of each contestant is characterized by the function H()
and its inverse. It is thus named as the characteristic function of the contest for
convenience.





Because f(x) is concave, we have H 0(x) > 0. As H(0) = 0; there exists a unique
x > 0 which solves equation (1.3). The solution to (1.3) constitutes a unique
symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, if and only if it globally maximizes a rep-
resentative contestant is expected payo¤ i given that all others exert the same
e¤ort. We now formally establish the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric
pure-strategy equilibrium.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that N( 2) contestants participate in the contest. If
they learn the actual number (N) of participants, each contestant in the unique




v) > 0; (1.4)
where H 1 () is the inverse of the characteristic function H (). The overall e¤ort
of the N-person contest is then given by
E(N)  Nx(N) = N H 1(N   1
N2
v): (1.5)
Proof. x(N) of (1.4) is derived from the rst order condition (1.3). To establish
it as a symmetric equilibrium, if su¢ ces to show that a representative contestant
is expected payo¤i is globally concave in xi given that all others exert the e¤ort




[f(x)+(N 1)x(N)]2v   1. As f 0(x)  0 and f 00(x)  0, f(x)
increases and f 0(x) decreases with their arguments. Hence, @i
@xi
decreases with
xi, i.e. i is concave in xi: i increases with xi when xi  x(N) and i decreases
with xi when xi  x(N). A symmetric equilibrium is therefore established where
every contestant exerts e¤ort x(N). As (1.3) has a unique solution, the symmetric
equilibrium with x(N) is unique.
Having obtained the solution to every possible contest withN participants, we
are now ready to nd the expected total e¤ort of the game when the D policy is
adopted. Given the xed entry probability q; the probability ofN 2 f0; 1; 2; :::;Mg
contestants showing up is given by Pr(N) = CNMq
N(1   q)M N . Hence, the ex-

























Contest with Concealment We now analyze the subgame in which the actual
number of participants is not revealed by the contest organizer. A participant i





N 1(1  q)M Npi(xi;x i;N)v   xi:
Proposition 2 If the actual number of participating contestants is not disclosed,











in the unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, where H 1 () is the inverse
of the characteristic function H ().
Proof. We rst assume that a symmetric equilibrium exists. The rst order








v   1 = 0: (1.8)
A concave f() implies that f 0(x)
f(x)
must be monotonic. Hence, there exists a
unique solution to the function, as given by (1.7). It remains to verify that












j 6=i f(xj) is negative because of
the concavity. Second, i(xi;x i; q) is a weighted sum of pi(xi;x i;N). Hence,
i(xi;x i; q) must be concave in xi as well. The global concavity ensures that
the solution of (1.7) constitutes an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 establishes the unique pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium of













2.1.2 Convex Impact Functions
Symmetric equilibria in a contest do not necessarily require a conave impaction
function. A convex impact function would, however, substantially complicate the
analysis, because a contestants payo¤ function may not be globally concave. In
a two-player setting, Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1994) demonstrates the dif-
culty in characterizing the equilibria when the impact function gets excessively
convex.
The analysis in our context can be further complicated by stochastic entries.
We now explore the possible equilibria when convex impact functions are in
place. We propose two examples to demonstrate these possibilities. Because of
log-concavity of f(x), equations (1.3) and (1.8) would continue to yield unique
solution, as given by (1.4) and (1.7), respectively. However, the solutions to
rst order conditions do not necessarily constitute an equilibrium. In the two
examples we discuss below, unique symmetric equilibria do exist and the results
established in the previous section (Propositions 1 and 2, (1.6) and (1.9)) continue
to apply.
We rst consider the popularly studied Tullock contest with impact function
f(x) = xr. The following can be obtained.
Claim 1 When r 2 (1; 1 + 1
M 1 ], there always exist a unique symmetric pure-
strategy equilibrium.
(a) When N is disclosed, in a N-person contest, each participant exerts an














Proof. Please refer to Appendix A.
It has been well known that when N , the number of participants, is common
knowledge, a symmetric equilibrium exists in a Tullock if and only if r  1+ 1
N 1 .
When r falls below the cuto¤ 1 + 1
M 1 , a unique symmetric equilibrium results
in a contest with disclosure regardless of the actual number N . We further show
that the cuto¤ also guarantees the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium
in a contest with concealment. The equilibrium e¤ort outlays are adapted from
(1.4) and (1.7), respectively. The overall e¤orts in contests with disclosure and
concealment can also be obtained from (1.6) and (1.9), respectively.
Further, we consider another family of convex impact functions that could
also yield symmetric equilibrium. Consider the family of impact functions f (x) =
ex   1, with  2 (0; 1]. For analytical convenience, we normalize the prize to
v = 1. We show the following.
Claim 2 Let f (x) = ex 1, with  2 (0; 1]. When M  4, a unique symmetric
equilibrium exists in the contest regardless of the prevailing disclosure policy.
(a) When N is disclosed, in a N-person contest, each participant exerts the
equilibrium e¤ort
x(N) =   1

ln(1  N   1
N2
): (1.10)
(b) When N is concealed, each participant exerts the equilibrium e¤ort






N 1(1  q)M NN   1
N2
]: (1.11)
Proof. Please refer to Appendix A.
Remark 2 identies another possible context where convex impact function
render symmetric equilibria. Again, (1.10) and (1.11) are adapted from (1.4) and
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(1.7) respectively. The overall e¤orts in contests with disclosure and concealment
can be obtained from (1.6) and (1.9), respectively.
2.2 Optimal Disclosure Policy
We now compare (1.6) with (1.9) to investigate the e¤ort-maximizing disclosure


















)v], which simply requires H 1() to be convex, and therefore the
characteristic function H()  f()
f 0() to be strictly concave. We summarize our
results as follows.
Theorem 1 Suppose that every contestant independently enters the contest with
the same exogenous probability q and symmetric equilibria exist for contests with
disclosure and concealment of number of entrants.
(a) Disclosing the actual number of contestants elicits strictly more (less) ef-
fort than concealing the actual number of contestants, if the characteristic func-
tion H() is strictly concave (convex).
(b) (Disclosure Irrelevance) The resultant expected total e¤ort is independent
of the disclosure policy, if the characteristic function H() is linear.
We do not lay out a dedicated proof, but briey interpret the logic that under-
pins our main result. Note that the function H 1() (as well as its inverse H())
plays a pivotal role in determining the equilibrium e¤ort of each participating
contestant. As revealed by (1.3) and (1.4), each contestants equilibrium e¤ort
depends crucially on the properties of the characteristic function (and those of its
inverse), which are fundamentally determined by the contest technology f(). Re-
call from (1.4) that a contestant exerts an equilibrium e¤ort x(N) = H 1(N 1
N
v).
The function H() thus depicts how contestants respond to the competitive en-
vironment of the contest, e.g., how they respond to changes in the number of
competitors and/or the value of prize, etc. As illustrated below, a given contest
11
environment would trigger sharply di¤erent responses by contestants when the
prevailing contest technologies (i.e., the characteristic functions) di¤er.
When N is to be concealed, each participating contestant exerts a uniform









By way of contrast, when N is to be disclosed, each participating contestant
responds to each realization of N by exerting an e¤ort x(N) = H 1(N 1
N2
v) upon









A larger N implies that a less favorable contest is realized. Hence, when N is
disclosed, a contestant exerts more e¤ort when N ( 2) is small, while he exerts
less e¤ort when N is large.3 A concave H() (i.e., a convex H 1()) implies that
a contestants equilibrium e¤ort is increasingly elastic with respect to the value
of its argument. A contestant tends to respond increasingly sensitively to any
given decrease in N (by increasing e¤ort x(N)), but less sensitively to any given
increase in N . A strictly concave characteristic function leads a contestant to
behave as if he were risk-loving when he supplies his e¤ort, in spite of his risk-
neutrality: a smaller N (a more favorable contest) incentivizes a contestant more
than a larger N (a less favorable contest) disincentivizes him. Consequently, each
contestant, on average, exerts more e¤ort when N is disclosed than when it is
concealed.
By way of contrast, when H() is convex (i.e., H 1() is concave) and the
realized N is disclosed, a contestant responds more sensitively to an increase in
N (by lowering his e¤ort), but less sensitively to a decrease in N . A strictly
convex characteristic function leads a contestant to behave as if he were risk-
averse: A larger N (a less favorable contest) disincentivizes him more than a
smaller N (a more favorable contest) incentivizes him. This leads to the result










3Note that 1N (1  1N ) decreases with N .
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Theorem 1(b) shows that TED(q) = TEC(q) if H(x) is linear in x. Lim and
Matros (2009) establish the disclosure-irrelevanceprinciple in a Tullock contest
with f(x) = axr. It can be directly veried that a linear characteristic function
results if and only if a Tullock contest prevails. Note H(0) = 0 and H 0() > 0:
Therefore, we must have H(x) = tx if H() is a linear function, with constant






di¤erential equation yields ln f(x) = ln(x
1
t ) + b, where b is a constant. It further
leads to f(x) = ebx
1
t , which takes the form of a power function. Our result
reveals that the disclosure-irrelevance principle of Lim and Matros (2009) is
essentially underpinned by the linearity of characteristics function H() that is
associated with a Tullockcontest.
There are many functional forms of impact function f() that guarantee the
existence of symmetric equilibria and lead to strictly concave or strictly con-
vex characteristic functions. We present below two examples to illustrate these
possibilities.
Example 1 Consider the family of functions f (x) = [ln (1 + x)]; with  2
(0; 1]. Simple calculus veries H (x) = f(x)
f 0 (x) = 
 1 (1 + x) ln (1 + x), which fur-
ther leads to H
0






> 0. We then
conclude that this functional form leads to a convex characteristic function.
Example 2 Consider the family of functions in Claim 2 of Section 2.1.2 f (x) =
ex   1, with  2 (0; 1]. As has been shown there, H 00 (x) =  e x < 0: This
functional form then yields a concave characteristic function.
3 Extensions and Discussion
This part of the paper further explores the issue of information disclosure from
two additional dimensions. First, an extension that generalizes the disclosure
policy in the basic setting by allowing the contest organizer to partially reveal
13
the information on the actual number of participants is considered. Second, the
commitment issue of disclosure policy is explored. The impact function take the
same forms as in Section 2: Either f (x) is concave, or it belongs to the convex
family of Section 2.1.2.
3.1 Imperfect Information Disclosure
We have assumed that the organizer of the contest either fully discloses the
number of participating contestants, or completely withholds this information.
We now allow the organizer to partially disclose her information.
Let the organizers information disclosure strategy be depicted by an ordered
set (k1; k2; :::; kI), where ki 2 f1; : : : ;Mg and 1  I  M: We arrange kis in
ascending order and let kI =M . Each (k1; k2;:::; kI) thus characterizes a partition
of the information space f1; 2; : : : ;Mg. The organizer does not announce the
exact realization of N , but discloses that N is in a partition set 
i = fki 1 +
1; : : : ; kig, i.e., ki 1 + 1  N  ki. For convenience, we assume k0  0.
When I = M , the nest partition is obtained. The partition strategy con-
verges to a full disclosure strategy and the exact realization of N is revealed.
When I = 1, the partition strategy is the coarsest, reducing to a concealment
policy. The ner the partition, the more information on the actual number of
contestants is revealed to contestants. We now investigate the optimal partition






t(1  q)(M 1) t; i = 1; 2; :::; I. Pi is the conditional
probability that a participant faces a competition where the total number of
contestants falls within the range 
i.
When a contestant participates in the contest and is informed that N 2 
i,
he has to form a posterior belief of the number of competitors. He will be com-













i)1t (1  1t )v). This equilibrium e¤ort is obtained from the rst order
condition. The second order condition that guarantees that it is a global optimum
can be established similarly as in Section 2.1.1 if f (x) is concave; and it can be
established similarly as in the analysis for concealment of number of entrants as
in Section 2.1.2 if f (x) belongs to the convex families of Section 2.1.2. To save
space, we do not repeat these proofs.






We then conclude the following.
Theorem 2 Suppose that every contestant independently enters the contest with
the same exogenous probability q, and symmetric equilibria exist for contests with
disclosure and concealment of the partition sets.
(a) If the characteristic function H() is strictly concave (strictly convex), the
contest organizer fully discloses (fully conceals) the actual number of participating
contestants, and partial disclosure is never optimal.
(b) (Disclosure Irrelevance) The resultant expected total e¤ort is indepen-
dent of the disclosure strategy (i.e., how the partitions are constructed), if the
characteristic function H() is linear, where a Tullock contest with f(x) = axr
applies.
Proof. Let us merge two arbitrary neighbor partition sets 
j and 
j+1. After the
merger, we denote ~
 = 
j [ 






Pj + Pj+1. Then ~P is the conditional probability that a participant would face
a competition where the total number of contestants falls in ~
. The expected















































































In this case, a coarser partition strategy always leads to more e¤ort. At the
optimum, the organizer creates only one partition set (I = 1 and k1 = M), i.e.,
she discloses no information to participating contestants.
When the characteristic function is strictly concave, the comparison is re-
versed: the ner the partition strategy, the more e¤ort is expended in the contest.
The optimum requires full information disclosure, i.e., I =M .
When the characteristic function is linear, where a Tullock contest applies
and f(x) takes the form f(x) = axr, merging the two partitions does not a¤ect
equilibrium e¤ort.
We then obtain the results of Theorem 2.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 2 strengthens the argument of Theorem 1. The results of Theorem
1 are robust even when a partial disclosure strategy is allowed in the game.
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It further veries that the optimal disclosure policy depends crucially on the
concavity of the characteristic function. More importantly, partial disclosure
never emerges in the equilibrium if the characteristic function is strictly concave
or strictly convex.
We again nd that the disclosure irrelevanceprinciple applies in the case of
linear characteristic functions (i.e., Tullock contests). Theorem 2(b) substantially
adds to our knowledge of behavior in this type of contest: the equilibrium level of
e¤ort expended in the contest does not depend on whether the contest organizer
discloses information and how much information is disclosed, despite there being
numerous ways to construct a partition disclosure strategy!
3.2 Commitment of Disclosure Policy
We assume that the contest organizer commits to her disclosure policy prior
to the realization of the actual number of contestants. We follow the standard
literature on mechanism design, such as Myerson (1981), and assume that the
contest organizer has commitment power. Lim and Matros (2009) have also
studied a case where the organizer is unable to commit, and can decide whether
or not to disclose the actual number of participants after the number has been
realized. They showed that the contest organizer would be unable to conceal the
information, and she always reveals it in equilibrium. The same result would be
obtained in the setting studied in this paper, regardless of the contest technology.4
It should be noted that the inability to commit could harm the contest orga-
nizer, as it has been shown here that concealing the actual number of contestants
can elicit more e¤ort, when the characteristic function H() is convex. Hence, it
would be theoretically interesting and important to explore the mechanisms that
strengthen the commitment power of the contest organizer. A thorough analysis
on the commitment issue of disclosure policy is beyond the scope of this study,
4A detailed proof is omitted for the sake of brevity, but it is available from the authors upon
request.
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but will be pursued by the authors in future studies. However, two remarks are
in order to address this issue.
First, the contest organizer can seek third parties to maintain the credibility
of her disclosure policy. One mechanism for this is to resort to obtaining cer-
tication from the relevant authorities, such as notaries, to verify the integrity
of the committed contest rules. When the characteristic function is convex, it
would be incentive-compatible to exercise such a procedure in order to main-
tain a concealment policy in the contest, provided it does not entail prohibitive
certifying costs. Alternatively, the contest organizer may outsource or delegate
the administrative task to independent parties, which carry out the rules of the
contest on her behalf.
Second, the contest organizer can carry out a concealment policy more cred-
ibly when she sponsors the contest not once but repeatedly over time. Insights
can be borrowed from the notion of reputation equilibria, and the extensive lit-
erature on reputation building.5 Reputation concerns create a trade-o¤ between
immediate gains and long-run payo¤s, and provide the contest organizer with
additional incentives to maintain her concealment policy. Although the contest
organizer can be tempted to reveal the actual number of contestants when it turns
out to be low (which, if revealed, would incentivize each participant to supply
more e¤ort) in a single contest, she may refrain from doing so since it prevents
her from establishing her reputation, and the loss can outweigh the temporary
advantage. Deviation in one period changes the beliefs of the contestants. By
a logic analogous to the full-revelation result in single-period contests (see Lim
and Matros, 2009), the organizer may have to reveal the information in all future
periods. This necessarily leads to less future e¤ort on average.
5 Reader is referred to Shapiro (1982 and 1983), Fudenberg and Levine (1989), Fudenberg,
Kreps and Maskin (1990), and Kreps (1990).
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4 Concluding Remarks
The current study examines the impact of disclosure on expected e¤ort in contests
with a stochastic number of contestants. Our analysis provides important insights
into the design of a contest with a stochastic number of contestants. We showed
that whenever the characteristic function H(x) = f(x)
f 0(x) is linear (i.e., Tullock
contest technology), the expected total e¤ort in a contest does not depend on how
much information on the actual number of contestants is revealed to participants.
However, this result does not hold when the characteristic function is nonlinear.
The comparison is determined by the concavity of the characteristic function.
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Chapter Two
Contests with Endogenous and
Stochastic Entry
1 Introduction
Economic agents are often involved in contests. They expend costly e¤ort to
compete for a limited number of prizes, while their investments are usually non-
refundable whether they win or lose. A wide variety of economic activities ex-
emplify such competitions. They include rent-seeking, lobbying, political cam-
paigns, R&D races, competitive procurement, college admissions, ascents of orga-
nizational hierarchies, and movement in internal labor markets. The vast wealth
of literature on contests has delineated economic agentsstrategic behaviors in
contests from diverse perspectives, and has identied the various institutional
elements in contest design that a¤ect bidding incentives.
Most existing studies focus on a setting where a xed number (n) of bid-
ders participate. These studies, under the xed-n paradigm, typically abstract
away from the ex ante contest participation decisions of bidders and focus on
their post-entry activities, assuming that the actual number of active participants
is commonly known. In this paper, we complement these studies by explicitly
examining a setting where bidders have to make a strategic decision about par-
ticipating in a contest. They enter contests randomly, so the actual number of
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participants in a particular contest is uncertain. Participants take into account
this uncertainty when placing their bids.1
As noted by Konrad (2009), a bidder often bears a nontrivial (xed) entry
cost, which can be explicitly sunk resources or foregone outside opportunities.
Incurring the costs allows a bidder to merely participate and is unrelated to their
chances of winning.2 In our setting, a xed pool of potential bidders decide
whether to participate and then sink their bids after entering the contest. Each
bidder weighs his expected payo¤ in future competitions against the entry cost,
and participates if and only if the former (at least) o¤sets the latter. With
nontrivial entry costs, we show that a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium
emerges: each potential bidder enters with the same probability, and adopts the
same (possibly mixed) bidding strategy upon entry.
This entry-bidding game complements and enriches the existing literature in
several aspects. We elaborate upon its distinct avors as follows.
First, the strategy of each potential bidder involves two elements in a con-
test with endogenous entry: (1) whether to enter; and (2) how to bid after
entering. This entry-bidding game exemplies a discontinuous game with two-
dimensional actions (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986). The game distinguishes itself
from standard contests that are typically identied as uni-dimensional discontin-
uous games (Baye, Kovenock and de Vries 1994 and Alcalde and Dahm, 2010),
where a players strategy involves only his bidding action.3 Due to stochastic
entry, the conventional approach to establish equilibrium existence in contests
(Baye, Kovenock and de Vries 1994 and Alcalde and Dahm, 2010) does not en-
1We show later that the optimal contest in general entails nondisclosure of the actual number
of contestants.
2An analogy is that while an air ticket enables the American tennis player Venus Williams
to arrive at the Australian Open, it does not help her win the championship. Similarly, to
participate in a R&D tournament, a research company may need to acquire some necessary
laboratory equipment to gather project-specic information, or to turn down other protable
tasks, while its chances of winning depend on its subsequent creative input.
3The literature on contests recognizes that (Baye, Kovenock and de Vries 1994, and Al-
calde and Dahm, 2010), a well-dened contest success function (e.g., Tullock contest) can be
discontinuous at its origin, i.e., when all bidders bid zero.
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compass our settings where the number of active players is uncertain.4 This novel
setting entails the application of Dasgupta and Maskins (1986) general theorem
on multi-dimensional discontinuous games, which allows us to establish the ex-
istence of a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in the entry-bidding game.5
To our knowledge, our analysis provides the rst application of the existence
theorem for multi-dimensional settings in the contest literature.
Second, the bidding behavior in contests with stochastic participation has yet
to be explored thoroughly. It is well-known in the literature that a bidders payo¤
maximization problem becomes irregular when the contest success function is
excessively elastic to e¤ort, e.g. when the discriminatory parameter r in a Tullock
contest exceeds certain boundaries. Stochastic entries further complicate the
analysis. By taking into account the uncertainty caused by the stochastic entries,
a participant chooses his bid to maximize his expected payo¤, which amounts to a
weighted sum of a series of irregular functions of his bid. Furthermore, the weights
of the summation are determined by the endogenously formed entry probabilities.
The general property of a bidders overall expected payo¤ function cannot be
readily discerned. We establish su¢ cient conditions under which participating
bidders do (or do not) randomize their bids upon entry. This result allows us
to derive an equilibrium bidding strategy in this game and further analyse the
design of contests.
Third, endogenous entry yields rich implications for contest design. We fol-
4To solve for the entry-bidding equilibrium, the traditional approach in the auction literature
proceeds in two steps. First, the existence of symmetric bidding equilibrium is shown for each
given (symmetric) entry probability and solved for the biddersequilibrium payo¤s. Second, a
break-even condition characterizes the equilibrium entry. This approach is inappropriate in our
setting. The rst step (nding the bidding equilibrium when potential bidders enter with xed
probabilities) is solvable in an auction setting, but not when the parameter r for the Tullock
contest is big, as in our case. As such, existing results on the existence of equilibria in contests
does not apply to contests with random entry and an uncertain number of active players. More
detail is provided in Section 3.
5One should note that our two-dimensional strategy space of (entry, e¤ort) cannot be re-
duced to a setting with single dimensional strategy of e¤ort with a positive xed cost. In our
two dimensional setting, if no one enters the contest, no one wins. If everyone enters but exerts
zero e¤ort, every one incurs an entry cost and has an equal chance at winning. In the single
dimensional setting, if everyone exerts zero e¤ort, no one incurs any costs but has an equal
chance at winning.
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low the mainstream literature by searching for mechanisms that maximize the
expected overall bid in a contest, and examine three issues: (1) whether the
contest designer prefers a more precise winner selection mechanism; (2) whether
the contest designer should exclude potential bidders, and invite only a subset
of them to participate in the competition; and (3) whether the contest designer
could improve the contests design by disclosing the actual number of participat-
ing bidders when she can observe it.
 Precision Could Hurt: We focus on Tullock contests and regard the
discriminatory parameter r as a measure of the level of noise in the winner
selection mechanism. A greater r implies that a higher bid can be more
e¤ectively translated into a higher likelihood of winning, thereby increasing
the marginal return to the bid. Conventional wisdom informs us that a
greater r provides higher-powered incentives and intensies competition.
We demonstrate, nevertheless, that in our setting the expected overall bid
does not vary monotonically with the size of r. A contest with a smaller
r can paradoxically elicit more e¤ort. An immediate trade-o¤ is triggered
when r is raised. A more precise contest incentivizes each participant to bid
more, while an overheated competition leaves lesser rent for participants,
thereby discouraging entries. Moreover, contestants entry probabilities
a¤ect the expected overall bids ambiguously. More active entry expands
the contest and tends to amplify the overall supply of bids; while it also
leads individual participants to bid more prudently, as they anticipate more
potential competitors and a smaller chance of winning. The optimum has
to balance out these diverse and possibly conicting forces.
 Exclusion Helps: Based on results on optimal precision,6 we investigate
whether the contest designer is better o¤ when there is a larger pool of
potential bidders. Without endogenous entry, the contest literature states
6Optimal r is contingent on number of potential contestants.
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that the overall bid always increases with the number of bidders. How-
ever, our analysis reveals the opposite: contests elicit lesser e¤ort, when
a larger pool of potential bidders may enter. Contest designers prefer to
limit competition by inviting only a subset of them for participation. The
existing studies on shortlisting and exclusion, e.g. those of Baye, Kovenock
and de Vries (1993), Taylor (1995), Fullerton and McAfee (1999), and Che
and Gale (2003), usually focus on heterogeneous contestants, and concern
themselves with selecting (usually two) players of the right types.Our
result, however, espouses the merit of exclusion in a setting of homogenous
players and concerns itself with creating a contest of the right size.
 Opaqueness May Pay O¤: We establish that there is no loss of gener-
ality when considering the optimal design of contests that do not disclose
the actual number of participants. It is in general suboptimal for the con-
test designer to announce the actual number of participants when she can
observe it.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the relation
of our paper to the relevant literature in the rest of this section. In section 3,
we set up the model, and establish our main results on equilibrium existence.
Optimal contest design is explored in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 Relation to Literature
Our paper complements the literature on contests and auctions in various as-
pects.7 We next discuss the links to these two strands of literature respectively.
7Our paper can also be related to the literature on standard oligopolistic competition. Our
paper echoes the argument of Dixit and Shapiro (1986) and Shapiro (1989) on rmsbehavior
in oligopolistic markets. He shows that Bertrand competition, which is ercer, can be more
anti-competitive ex post than Cournot competition, which is ex ante more subdued, as the
latter limits the contestability of the market and discourages entries. We focus on the issue of
mechanism design in our particular context. In addition, the level of post-entry competition is
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2.1 Contests
Our paper provides a comprehensive and formal account of equilibrium existence
in the entry-bidding game. Our paper primarily belongs to the literature on
equilibrium existence in contests. Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) establish
the existence of pure-strategy equilibria when contestants have concave produc-
tion functions. The existence and properties of the equilibria remain a nagging
problem for contests with less well-behaved technologies. Baye, Kovenock and
de Vries (1994) establish the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-player
Tullock contests with r  2. Alcalde and Dahm (2010) further the literature by
showing that all-pay auction equilibria exist under a wide class of contest suc-
cess functions.8 Both studies apply the results of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)
on uni-dimensional discontinuous games. Our paper contributes to this litera-
ture by introducing biddersentry decisions while allowing the number of active
bidders to be stochastic. These new avours enrich our analysis by forming a
two-dimensional discontinuous game, and provide a novel application of the gen-
eral result of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) on multi-dimensional discontinuous
games in the contest literature.
The literature on contests with endogenous entry remains scarce. Higgins,
Shughart, and Tollison (1985) in their pioneering work study a tournament model
in which each rent seeker bears a xed entry cost, and randomly participates in
equilibrium. In an all-pay auction model, Kaplan and Sela (2010) provide a
rationale for entry fees in contests. Besides the di¤ering modeling choice and
the diverging focus, Kaplan and Sela (2010) di¤er from the current paper in a
few other aspects. First, they allow players to bear privately-known entry costs,
while we assume that entry cost is uniform and commonly known. Second, they
let participants know who else has entered, while we focus mainly on uninformed
participants. However, we also study the ramications of disclosure policy as an
a continuous variable and is considered as a strategic choice of the contest designer.
8Wang (2010) also characterizes the equilibria in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests
when r is large.
25
institutional element of contests.
Two recent experimental studies, Cason, Masters and Sherementa (2010) and
Morgan, Orzen and Sefton (2010), also contribute to this research agenda by
studying biddersentries. Similar to Morgan, Orzen and Seftons (2010) theoreti-
cal model, Fu and Lu (2010) also assume that potential bidders enter sequentially,
so neither setting involves stochastic participation.
A handful of papers have examined contests with stochastic participation.
The majority of these studies, however, assume exogenous entry patterns. Myer-
son and Wärneryd (2006) examine a contest with an innite number of potential
entrants, whose entry follows a Poisson process. Münster (2006), Lim and Matros
(2009) and Fu, Jiao and Lu (2011) assume a nite pool of potential contestants,
with each contestant entering the contest with a xed and independent proba-
bility.
The current study also contributes to the growing literature on contest design
by exploring the optimal mechanism in a context with endogenous and stochastic
entries.
First, our analysis complements the literature on the proper level of preci-
sion in evaluating bidding performance. Conventional wisdom says that a precise
contest incentivizes aggressive bidding. A handful of studies, however, espouse
low-powered incentives in contests and demonstrate that a less discriminatory
contest can improve e¢ ciency. One salient example is provided by Lazear (1989),
who argues that excessive competition leads to sabotage. A more popular stream
in the literature instead stresses the handicappinge¤ect of the imprecise per-
formance evaluation mechanism in (two-player) asymmetric contests. When con-
testants di¤er in their abilities, a noisier contest balances the playeld. This e¤ect
encourages weaker contestants to bid more intensely, and deters the stronger ones
from shirking. OKee¤e, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1984) are among the rst to
formalize this logic. This rationale is further elaborated upon by Che and Gale
(1997, 2000), Fang (2002), Nti (2004), Amegashie (2009), and Wang (2010). In a
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recent study, Epstein, Mealem and Nitzan (2011) contend that contest designers
still prefer all-pay auctions to Tullock contests if they can strategically discrimi-
nate between bidders. In contrast to these studies, our paper adopts a N -player
symmetric contest, and stresses the trade-o¤ between ex post bidding incentives
and ex ante entry incentives. Our paper is closely related to Cason, Masters and
Sheremetas (2010) experimental study in this aspect, which compares endoge-
nous entries in all-pay auctions and lottery contests.
Our nding on e¢ cient exclusion echoes a handful of pioneering studies by
Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1993), Taylor (1995), Fullerton and McAfee (1999),
and Che and Gale (2003). These studies typically involve heterogeneous bidders
and identify the subset of bidders with the most desirable characteristics. Das-
gupta (1990) studies a two-stage procurement tournament. Bidders invest in cost
reduction in the rst stage, and place their bids in the second. Wider competition
may diminish biddersincentives to engage in R&D. Limiting the number of com-
peting rms may or may not benet the principal. None of these studies involves
entry cost and endogenous entry. In contrast to these studies, an invited (poten-
tial) bidder in our setting has to decide whether to enter the subsequent contest,
and the entry pattern in the equilibrium remains endogenous and stochastic.
Our study is also related to the literature on e¢ cient disclosure and feedback
rules in contests.9 Lim and Matros (2009) are the rst to examine the issue
of disclosing the number of contestants, where potential bidders enter with an
exogenous probability. They demonstrate the independence of prevailing policy
in Tullock contests with r = 1 and linear e¤ort costs. Fu, Jiao and Lu (2011)
further reveal that the optimal disclosure policy depends on the characteristics
of the production functions of contestants. The current paper illustrates the
critical role played by the convexity of the bidding cost function and endogeneity
of entry.
9Aoyagi (2010), Gershkov and Perry (2009), Ederer (2010), Gürtler and Harbring (2010),
and Goltsman and Mukherjee (2011) focus on interim performance feedback in dynamic con-
tests. In contrast, our paper looks at interim feedback on entries.
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2.2 Auctions with Stochastic Entry
Our paper is also related to the literature on auctions with endogenous entry.
Myerson (1981) shows that a second-price or rst-price auction with an optimal
reserve price is revenue-maximizing when bidders bear zero entry costs. Samuel-
son (1985), Menezes and Monteiro (2000) and Lu (2009) require that bidders sink
entry costs to participate in auctions. Levin and Smith (1994), Shi (2009), Lu
(2010) and Moreno and Wooders (2010) allow bidders to make costly investments
to learn their valuations of the object for sale. These studies conclude that rev-
enue maximization requires weaker incentives, i.e. lower reservation prices, than
that in Myerson (1981), due to the trade-o¤ between the ex post incentive to bid
and the ex ante incentives of entry or information acquisition.
Our study departs subtly from the auction literature in two main aspects.
First, the auction design problem addresses an adverse-selection problem: bid-
ders possess private information about their own types and therefore the optimal
mechanism screens heterogeneous bidders. Our contest design problem neverthe-
less concerns itself primarily with a moral hazard problem: the type of player
is commonly known, while the optimal mechanism sets out to incentivize e¤ort
supply. Second, the auction literature shows that a weaker ex ante incentive,
i.e. a reserve price lower than Myersons (1981) zero-entry-cost benchmark, is
always necessary whenever entry or information acquisition is costly. By way of
contrast, the optimum in our setting could involve either a weaker (i.e. a smaller
precision r) or a stronger (i.e. a bigger precision r) ex ante incentive than that
for the zero-entry-cost benchmark.
Shortlisting and exclusion have long been recognized as an important element
in designing auctions with costly entry. Our setting resembles that of Sameulson
(1985) and Lu (2009), as both studies assume that bidders bear common entry
costs, although the results di¤er. While Lu (2009) nds that shortlisting is not
necessarily optimal, we nd that contest designers can always elicit higher overall
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bids by excluding potential bidders. Levin and Smith (1994) let potential bidders
make costly investments to discover their valuations of the object. They establish
that the revenue in the optimum decreases with the number of potential bidders
to the extent that the information acquisition costs lead to a mixed-strategy
entry. Our nding echoes that of Levin and Smith (1994), despite the di¤erent
settings.
The optimal disclosure policy has also been examined in auctions with a
stochastic number of bidders. McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Levin and Oz-
denoren (2004) consider exogenous stochastic entry and show that the expected
revenue is independent of the disclosure policy when bidders are risk neutral.
Our paper allows for endogenous entry and concludes that concealment may
elicit strictly higher overall bid under various circumstances.
3 Model and Analysis
In this section, we rst set up the model and then conduct the equilibrium analy-
sis.
3.1 Setup
We consider a two-stage game. A xed pool of M( 2) identical risk-neutral
potential bidders demonstrate interest in a contest with a winners purse v > 0.
In the rst stage, potential bidders simultaneously decide whether or not to
participate. In the second stage, all participants simultaneously submit their
bids. A winner is selected and awarded the prize.
3.1.1 Winner Selection Mechanism
Suppose that N  2 potential bidders enter the contest. They simultaneously
submit their bids xi; i = 1; 2; :::; N , to compete for the prize v. The probability
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; if N  2, and
NX
j=1
xrj > 0; (2.1)
which follows the setup of widely adopted Tullock contest success function. If
all participants submit zero bids, the winner is randomly picked from the par-
ticipants. To the extent that only one bidder enters, he receives the prize v
automatically, regardless of his bid. In the event that nobody enters, the de-
signer keeps the prize.
A bid xi costs a bidder c(xi), with c0() > 0 and c00()  0. For the sake of
tractability, we assume that the bidding cost function takes the form c (xi) = xi ,
with   1.
It should be noted that our main theorem on equilibrium existence in the
entry-bidding game applies to contests with more general success functions and
cost functions, which will be discussed in more detail later in the paper.
3.1.2 Entry
In the rst stage of the game, potential bidders simultaneously decide whether
to participate in the contest. Each participant has to sink a xed cost  > 0 if
he enters. Entry is irreversible, and the cost  cannot be recovered. We impose
the following regularity condition on the model.
Assumption 1 v
M
<  < v.
The assumption requires that the entry cost  is nontrivial but not pro-
hibitively high. First, no entry is triggered if it costs more than the winners
purse. Second, the analysis becomes relatively trivial when entry involves little
cost, in which case the institutional elements of the contest do not a¤ect bidders
entry incentives signicantly. Under Assumption 1, no equilibria exist where all
potential bidders participate in the contest with certainty.
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In our main analysis, we assume that each participating bidder does not know
the actual number N of participants. This setting leads to a two-dimensional dis-
continuous game and demands a more sophisticated analysis. Two remarks are
in order. First, entry often involves hidden actions, which cannot be readily ob-
served or veried by other parties. Second, one may view the public observability
of N as an institutional element, which is to be chosen strategically by the contest
designer. In Section 4.3, we assume that the contest designer is able to observe
N and choose the disclosure policy of the contest. We show that a contest would
in general elicit lesser bids when N is to be disclosed.
3.1.3 Some Preliminaries
Before the formal analysis is carried out, we dene two cuto¤probabilities, which
are used repeatedly throughout the analysis.
Denition 1 Let q 2 (0; 1) be the unique solution to (1 (1 q)M)v Mq = 0,
and q0 2 (0; 1) be the unique solution to (1  q)M 1v   = 0.
Comparing the two cuto¤s leads to the following.
Lemma 1 q0 < q.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Let us discuss the implications of the two cuto¤s briey, although their impli-
cations unfold as the analysis proceeds. The entry-bidding game cannot trigger
an equilibrium, where all potential bidders enter with a probability more than
q: they would otherwise end up with negative expected payo¤ in the game. In
contrast, the cuto¤ q0 denes a lower bound. If there is an equilibrium where
all potential bidders enter with a probability less than q0, participating bidders
must randomize their bids upon entry.
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3.2 Existence of Symmetric Equilibrium
A bidder is behavioral strategy is an ordered pair (qi; i(xi)), where qi is the
probability he enters the contest, and xi is his bid submitted upon entry. We
allow him to randomize on his bids. The probability distribution i(xi) depicts
his behavioral bidding strategy conditional on his entry. It reduces to a singleton
when the participant does not randomize his bid.
Assumption 1 implies that potential bidders play a mixed-strategy in the
entry stage. Each participant is uncertain about the actual level of competition
when placing his bid. He bids based on his rational belief about othersentry
patterns. The solution concept of a subgame perfect equilibrium would not apply,
because participants possess only imperfect information and no proper subgame
exists after the entry stage. We simply use the concept of Nash equilibrium to
solve the game. An equilibrium is a strategy combination Mi=1(qi; i(xi)) of all
contestants, which requires that the pair strategy (qi; i(xi)) of each potential
bidder i maximize his expected payo¤ based on his rational belief and others
strategy prole j 6=i(qj; j(xj).
We focus on the symmetric equilibrium of the game where all potential bid-
ders play the same strategy (q; (x)). As aforementioned, a potential bidders
payo¤ can be discontinuous as the contest success function is discontinuous at
origin (see Baye, Kovenock and de Vries, 1994, and Alcalde and Dahm, 2010),
i.e. when all participants bid zero. The strategy of each player involves two
elements. A conventional approach (in auction literature) to establishing the ex-
istence of symmetric equilibria proceeds with two steps, which disentangles the
two elements in each players strategy and simplies the analysis. In the rst
step, for each given (symmetric) entry probability, one shows the existence of
symmetric bidding equilibrium and solves for the biddersequilibrium payo¤s.
In the second step, a break-even condition characterizes the equilibrium entry
probability. This disentanglingapproach loses its bite in our setting.
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First, Dasgupta and Maskins (1986) theorem on uni-dimensional games can-
not be directly applied to games with an uncertain number of players. The
existence of a symmetric bidding equilibrium under a given entry probability q
has yet to be established using alternative approaches. Second, similar to contests
with deterministic participation, the bidding game may not be directly solvable
when the contest success function is excessively elastic, e.g. when the discrim-
inatory parameter r of a Tullock contest is excessively large. As a result, even
if an equilibrium exists, it remains di¢ cult to characterize the properties (e.g.
continuity and monotonicity) of biddersexpected payo¤s.
This game, however, can be viewed as a two-dimensional discontinuous game
(Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986). We apply the general result of Dasgupta and
Maskin (1986) for a multi-dimensional strategy space to establish the existence
of symmetric equilibria.
Theorem 1 (a) For any r > 0, a symmetric equilibrium (q; (x)) exists. In
the equilibrium, each potential bidder enters with a probability q 2 (0; q) and his
bid follows a probability distribution (x). (b) Each potential bidder receives an
expected payo¤ of zero in the entry-bidding equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
To our knowledge, Theorem 1 and its proof provide the rst application of
Dasgupta and Maskins (1986) equilibrium existence result on two-dimensional
discontinuous games in the literature on contests. A few remarks are in order.
First, the equilibrium existence result applies to broader contexts. We explicitly
adopt Tullock technologies to economize on our presentation and facilitate sub-
sequent discussion on contest design. However, the proof of the theorem does
not rely on the specic properties of Tullock success functions and the particular
form of bidding cost functions. The analysis can be readily adapted to contests
with more broadly dened success functions, such as those in Alcalde and Dahm
(2010), by redening the discontinuity set slightly. Second, our analysis has yet
33
to provide a more comprehensive account of equilibrium bidding behaviors, which
remains one of the central concerns in contest literature. In this entry-bidding
game, a participating bidder may randomize on his bid xi in the equilibrium.
We establish the relevant conditions for pure or mixed bidding strategies subse-
quently.
Before we proceed, it should be noted that multiple entry equilibria exist
in the game. With nontrivial entry cost ( > v
M
by Assumption 1), there
always exist asymmetric entry equilibria, where a subset of potential bidders stay
inactive regardless, while the others enter either randomly or deterministically.
Throughout this paper, we focus on symmetric entry equilibria for two reasons.
First, symmetric equilibria can be arguably viewed as a natural focal point.
Second, many asymmetric equilibria that involve only a subset of M 0(< M)
active players essentially can be analyzed through the symmetric equilibria in a
smaller entry-bidding game with a total of M 0(< M) potential bidders.
3.3 Existence of Equilibrium with Pure-Strategy Bidding
Suppose that a symmetric equilibrium with pure-strategy bidding exists. Con-
sider an arbitrary potential bidder i who has entered the contest. Suppose that
all other potential bidders play a strategy (q; x) with x > 0.10 He chooses his bid
xi to maximize his expected payo¤




N 1(1  q)M N [ x
r
i
xri + (N   1)xr
v   xi ]: (2.2)











[xri + (N   1)xr]2
  x 1i : (2.3)
10It is impossible to have all participating bidders bid zero deterministically in an equilibrium.
When all others bid zero, a participating bidder would prefer to place an innitely small positive
bid, which allows him to win the prize with probability one.
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The (pure) bidding strategy in such an equilibrium, if it exists, can be solved
for by the rst order condition di(xi)
dxi
jxi=x = 0. The following lemma fully char-
acterizes such an equilibrium if it exists.
Lemma 2 Suppose that a symmetric equilibrium (q; x) with pure-strategy bid-










) = . (2.4)

























Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 2 depicts the main properties of a symmetric equilibrium with pure-
strategy bidding, if it exists. We call equation (2.4) the break-even condition
of the entry-bidding game with pure-strategy bidding. It determines the entry
probability q in such an equilibrium. The break-even condition leads to the
following.
Lemma 3 (a) For any r > 0, there exists a unique q 2 (0; q) that satises the
break-even condition (2.4). Hence, x is also uniquely determined for the given r
by the break-even condition (2.4).
(b) The probability q strictly decreases with r.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 3 establishes a unique correspondence between r and (q; x). The
symmetric equilibrium with pure bidding strategy must be unique for each given
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r, whenever it exists. However, the strategy prole (q; x) of Lemma 2 may not
constitute an equilibrium.
Consider an arbitrary participating bidders payo¤ maximization problem.
Suppose that all other bidders enter the contest with a probability q and bid x
upon entry. The participating bidder i chooses his bid xi to maximize his expected
payo¤ i(xij q; x) in the contest, which is the weighted sum of Ni (xij q; x) =
xri
xri+(N 1)xr v   x










 xi is simply his expected payo¤ when he enters a contest in which he com-
petes against N   1 other bidders deterministically and each of them bids x. We
graphically illustrate the relation between Ni (xij q; x) and i(xij q; x) in Figure
2.1.


















Figure 2.1: The relation between Ni (xij q; x) and i(xij q; x)
The equilibrium analysis is trivial when r  1. In that case, each com-
ponent Ni (xij q; x) is concave. Maximizing i(xij q; x) is thus a well-behaved
concave program. In this case, the hypothetical equilibrium bid x, which is
determined by the rst order condition and the symmetry condition, must max-
imize i(xij q; x). A strategy prole with all playing (q; x) must constitute
the unique symmetric equilibrium.
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When r is large, however, the function Ni (xij q; x) is no longer globally con-
cave. It is well-known in the contest literature that maximizing Ni (xij q; x) is not
a regular program. The irregularity is exacerbated tremendously in our context.
First, it is di¢ cult to draw a general conclusion on the properties of the payo¤
function i(xij q; x), which is the weighted sum of a series of not necessarily con-




N 1(1   q)M N literally depend
on the entry probability q, which, however, is determined endogenously in the
equilibrium. The existing results on equilibrium existence obtained from contests
with deterministic participation cannot be carried over.
In subsequent analysis, we derive the upper (lower) bound of r which guaran-
tees the existence (non-existence) of a symmetric equilibrium with pure-strategy
bidding. Recall the unique correspondence between r and (q; x) (Lemma 3).
Consider a contest with a given r. Dene







xri + (N   1)xr
v)  xi ;
(2.7)
which is a participating bidder is expected payo¤ in the contest when all other
bidders play the strategy (q; x), as given by Lemma 2. Clearly, ~i(xi) is con-
tinuous on [0;1). The strategy prole (q; x) constitute an equilibrium if and
only if x is a global maximizer of ~i(xi).
The next result depicts an important property of the payo¤ function.
Lemma 4 When r 2 (1; (1 + 1
M 2)], x
 is the unique inner local maximizer of
~i(xi) over (0;1), i.e. ~i(x) > ~i(x);8x 2 (0;1) and x 6= x. There exists a
unique xm 2 (0; x) such that ~i(xi) decreases on [0; xm], increases on [xm; x],
and then decreases on [x;1).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 4 depicts the property of ~i(xi) when r remains in the range (1; (1+
1
M 2)]. We dene (1 +
1
M 2) as +1 when M = 2. Although it is no longer
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globally concave, the function still demonstrates the regularity as depicted by
Lemma 4. For x 2 (0;1), the function is locally minimized at xm and then
maximized at x 2 (xm;1). Hence, x is its unique maximizer for x 2 (0;1).
However, x has yet to be established as the global maximizer: the equilibrium
requires that the boundary condition ~i(x)  ~i(0) hold. Recall that x is
uniquely determined by (2.5) for each given r. A participating bidders expected
payo¤ in the contest when bidding x, i.e. ~i(x), would amount to exactly .
However, the bidder automatically receives a reserve payo¤ (1 q)M 1v from the
contest by bidding zero: with a probability (1 q)M 1, all other potential bidders
stay out of the contest, and a rent of (1 q)M 1v will accrue to him automatically.
Hence, the bidder has an incentive to bid x only if (1   q)M 1v  . The
implication of this condition is straightforward: bidding x(> 0) is rational only
if it generates nonnegative additional return (when all others bid x) in excess of
the reservation payo¤ from bidding zero. The condition essentially requires that
r be bounded from above: the contest must leave su¢ cient rent to contenders
and make sure that each bidder is su¢ ciently rewarded by bidding x.
Recall the cuto¤ q0 2 (0; q) depicted by Denition 1, which uniquely satises
(1  q0)M 1v = . The unique correspondence between r and (q; x), as deter-
mined by the break-even condition (2.4), allows us to obtain the following cuto¤
of r.













By Lemma 3(b), q is inversely related to r. The condition (1  q)M 1v  
requires q  q0, which would hold if and only if r  r0. We then conclude the
following.
Theorem 2 A symmetric equilibrium with pure-strategy bidding does not exist
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if r > r0.
Similar to contests with deterministic participation, pure-strategy bidding
cannot be sustained when r is excessively large. Theorem 2 provides a su¢ cient
condition under which randomized bidding must occur under endogenous entry.
When r > r0, the strategy prole (q; x) would not constitute an equilibrium.
In that case, a bidder, when bidding x, receives ~i(x) = . He would strictly
prefer to bid zero, because his expected payo¤ when bidding zero, (1  q)M 1v,
must be strictly more than. In other words, x is not a part of the best response
of player i to (q; x). The symmetric equilibria must involve randomized bidding.
By Lemma 4 and Denition 2, we dene the following cuto¤ of r.
Denition 3 Dene r , min(r0; M 1M 2).
The previous analysis leads to the following.
Theorem 3 For each r 2 (0; r], the strategy prole (q; x); as characterized by
Lemma 2, constitutes the unique symmetric equilibrium with pure-strategy bidding
during the entry-bidding game.
When r is bounded from above by both r0 and M 1M 2 , a unique symmetric
equilibrium with pure-strategy bidding emerges. The condition r 2 (0; r] guaran-
tees: (1) that the payo¤ function ~i(xi) is well-behaved, in the sense that its curve
reaches a unique peak at x for x 2 (0;1); and (2) that the boundary condition
~i(x
)  ~i(0) is met. We then conclude that x is the global maximizer when
r is subject to both upper bounds. The strategy prole (q; x) is established as
the unique symmetric equilibrium with pure-strategy bidding accordingly.
Theorem 3 imposes a (conservative) upper limit on r for the existence of such
an equilibrium. It should be noted that r  (1 + 1
M 2) is su¢ cient but not
necessary to establish x as the local maximizer of ~i(xi) for xi > 0. Analytical
di¢ culty prevents us from fully characterizing the property of ~i(xi) when r
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exceeds (1 + 1
M 2). It remains less than explicit how the equilibrium would
behave if (1 + 1
M 2) < r0 and r 2 ((1 + 1M 2); r0]. More denitive conclusions
can be drawn in more specic contexts with small numbers of potential bidders.
Corollary 1 When M is small, i.e. M = 2; 3, a symmetric equilibrium with
pure-strategy bidding exists if and only if r  r0.
In these instances, ((1 + 1
M 2); r0] is empty, because (1 +
1
M 2) > r0 re-
gardless of v and . Whenever r falls below r0, it automatically satises the
condition r  (1 + 1
M 2), which guarantees that x
 maximizes ~i(xi).
However, technical di¢ culty prevents us from drawing more general conclu-
sions analytically whenM is larger, which may lead r0 to exceed (1+ 1M 2). We
resort to a numerical exercise to obtain further insights about the properties of
the expected payo¤ function ~i(xi) when r 2 ((1 + 1M 2); r0]. For expositional
e¢ ciency, we postpone the presentation and discussion of these observations to
Section 4.1.2 as they shed light on the optimal contest design problem explored
in that section.
4 Contest Design
The equilibrium behavior of the bidders may depend critically on the institutional
elements of the contest. Central to the contest literature is the question of how
the contest rules a¤ect equilibrium bidding. As Gradstein and Konrad (1999)
argued, . . . contest structures result from the careful consideration of a variety
of objectives, one of which is to maximize the e¤ort of contenders.Based on
the equilibrium analysis, we follow this literature to discuss the optimal design
of a contest that maximizes the overall bid. Specically, we consider three main
issues: (1) the optimal level of accuracy of the winner selection mechanism (the
proper size of r in Tullock contests); (2) the e¢ ciency implications of shortlisting
and exclusion; and (3) the optimal disclosure policy.
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4.1 Optimal Accuracy: Choice of r
In a Tullock contest, the parameter r reects the discriminatory poweror the
level of precision of the winner selection mechanism in the contest. With a higher
r, a bidders win depends more on the level of his bid, rather than other noisy
or random factors. The level of precision in a contest is largely subject to the
autonomous choice of the contest designer. For instance, the designer can modify
the judging criteria of the contest to suit her strategic goals, e.g. adjusting the
weights of subjective component in contendersoverall ratings. Alternatively, she
can vary the composition of judging committees (experts vs. non-experts).
Following the literature (e.g. Nti, 2004), we let r be chosen strategically by
the contest designer. We then consider a three-stage game. The designer chooses
r and publicly announces it in the beginning. Next, the entry-bidding game
takes place. In the subsequent analysis, we investigate how the size of r a¤ects
the equilibrium bids.
Before we proceed, we consider the benchmark case of a contest with a xed
number M of participants. A larger r increases the marginal return of a bid and
further incentivizes bidders. It is well known in the contest literature that both
individual bids and overall bids strictly increase with r whenever a pure-strategy
equilibrium exists, i.e. r 2 [0; (1 + 1
M 1)]. This conventional wisdom, however,
loses its bite in our setting with endogenous entry.
4.1.1 Optimum
A contest with endogenous and costly entry involves tremendously more extensive
strategic trade-o¤s. On the one hand, a more discriminatory contest compels
participants to bid more, while on the other, the increasing dissipation of rent
limits entry. As revealed by Lemma 3, q would strictly decrease with r in the
symmetric equilibrium with pure-strategy bidding.
This trade-o¤, however, does not exhaust the intricacy involved in the deter-
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mination of optimal r. An additional trade-o¤ is triggered at a di¤ering layer.
More extensive participation (i.e. a higher q) does not necessarily improve the
supply of bids in the contest. On one hand, the contest on average engages more
bidders, which amplies the sources of contribution and tends to increase the
overall bid. On the other hand, each participant would bid less, as they antic-
ipate more intense competition and therefore expect lesser reward. The overall
e¤ect has yet to be explored more formally.
Consider an arbitrary entry-bidding game where potential bidders enter with
a probability q 2 (0; 1) in a symmetric equilibrium. The prize v is given away
with a probability 1  (1  q)M . Hence, bidders win an expected overall rent of
[1   (1   q)M ]v; while they on average incur entry cost Mq. The following
fundamental equality must hold in this symmetric equilibrium:
[1  (1  q)M ]v Mq( + E(x)): (2.8)
The fundamental equality allows us to identify the expected overall bidding cost
incurred by the bidders in the equilibrium without explicitly solving for it:
MqE(x) = [1  (1  q)M ]v  Mq: (2.9)
The convexity of cost function (  1) further implies that the expected overall
bid (MqE(x)) must be bounded from above:
(MqE(x)) =MqE[(x)
1
 ] Mq[E(x)] 1 . (2.10)
By the fundamental equality (2.8) or (2.9), we further obtain
(MqE(x))  [Mq] 1 f[1  (1  q)M ]v  Mqg 1 : (2.11)
Equation (2.11) yields important implication: Regardless of the equilibrium
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bidding strategy upon entry, RHS of (2.11) imposes an upper limit on the ex-
pected overall bids that an equilibrium with entry probability q could elicit. The
expected overall bid (MqE(x)) reaches the upper limit [Mq]
 1
  f[1   (1  
q)M ]v  Mqg 1 if and only if: (1) bidders play a pure bidding strategy upon
entry; or (2) participants randomize their bids but  = 1.
Denote the upper boundary by




[1  (1  q)M ]v  Mq	 1 (2.12)
with q 2 (0; 1). The function xT (q) exhibits the following important properties.
Lemma 5 (a) There exists a unique q^ 2 (q0; q), which uniquely maximizes xT (q);
(b) The function xT (q) strictly increases with q when q 2 (0; q^), and strictly
decreases when q 2 (q^; 1).
Proof. See Appendix B.
As stated by Lemma 5, the function xT (q) varies non-monotonically with
q and is uniquely maximized by q^ 2 (q0; q). This property implies that the
overall bid that can be possibly elicited from the contest will never exceed xT (q^),
regardless of the prevailing contest rules.
Denition 4 Dene xT   xT (q^), which indicates the maximum amount of the
overall bid a contest can elicit.
The key to the design problem unfolds in Lemma 5: a mechanism must be
optimal if it achieves the rst bestxT . We subsequently discuss the possibility
of eliciting the rst bestthrough contest design.
By Lemma 5 and (2.8)-(2.11), the rst best xT  can be achieved in a symmet-
ric equilibrium with an entry probability q^, if there exists a r^ that induces entry
probability q^ and (1) participants play a pure bidding strategy upon entry in the
equilibrium; or (2) participants randomize their bids but  = 1. For any given
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r, the exact forms of bidding strategies in equilibria with mixed bidding remain
unknown. It is di¢ cult to identify the correspondence between prevailing contest
rules and the subsequent equilibrium when it involves randomized bidding. We
thus focus on the possibility of inducing the rst bestin equilibria with pure-
strategy bidding. Nevertheless, our investigation shows it is rather su¢ cient to
focus on contests that induce pure-strategy bidding.
Recall that Lemma 3 establishes the unique correspondence between r and
(q; x) if a symmetric equilibrium with pure-strategy bidding exists. The equi-











] = . We highlight the following cuto¤.











] = : (2.13)
The following result is formally stated.
Theorem 4 (a) r(q^) < r0.
(b) Whenever r(q^)  (1 + 1
M 2), the contest designer can elicit the rst
best xT  by setting r = r(q^). It induces a symmetric equilibrium with pure-
strategy bidding. Potential bidders enter the contest with a probability q^ in the
symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Setting r to r(q^) could allow the contest designer to elicit the rst best
xT
  xT (q). Because r(q^) 2 (0; r0), whenever r(q^) falls below (1 + 1M 2), it
satises the su¢ cient condition r  r, thereby inducing a symmetric equilibrium
with pure-strategy bidding by Theorem 3. In the equilibrium, potential bidders
enter the contest with a probability of exactly q^. By Lemma 5, the expected
overall bid must strictly decrease when r deviates from r(q^).
Additional discussion is provided as follows to complement our analysis.
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4.1.2 Discussion
Two main issues are discussed. First, we compare our results to benchmark cases.
Second, we examine the robustness of our result to what extend the condition
r(q^) could robustly induce pure-strategy bidding.
Comparison to Benchmark Cases Our results run in sharp contrast to the
conventional wisdom in contest literature. In a contest with a xed number M
of participants or free entry, a higher r provides stronger incentives to bidders,
and elicits strictly higher bids whenever a pure-strategy equilibrium prevails, i.e.
when r  (1+ 1
M 1). The size of r in our setting, however, a¤ects the resultant
equilibrium bid non-monotonically.
Despite the various trade-o¤s between conicting forces, a softer ex ante in-
centive, i.e. a smaller r, may or may not be optimal. The optimal size of the
parameter could either fall below or remain above the benchmark (1 + 1
M 1).
In the left panel of Figure 2.2, the observations demonstrate the incidence of
optimal softincentives, with r(q^) < (1+ 1
M 1). In the right panel, the results

































Figure 2.2: The optimal size of r(q^) when M = 5;  = 1:5
These observations also contrast the results of related studies in auction liter-
ature. A number of studies have been devoted to the optimal design of auctions
with costly entry, including Menezes and Monteiro (2000) and Lu (2009), Levin
and Smith (1994), Shi (2009), Lu (2010) and Moreno and Wooders (2010). They
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all espouse the optimality of a softerincentive: the optimal reserve price is al-
ways lower than in the free-entry benchmark. The insight from auction literature
does not extend to our setting. The observations in Figure 2.2 demonstrate that
the optimum does not necessarily requires a lower-powered incentive mechanism
than the free-entry benchmark level (1 + 1
M 1).
11
Robustness and Numerical Exercises Our analysis has been limited so far.
The global optimality of r(q^) is conditioned on that it also leads to pure-strategy
bidding. It remains to be explored to what extent r(q^) could robustly induce
pure-strategy bidding.
Because r(q^) < r0, pure-strategy bidding can be induced as long as r(q^) falls
below (1 + 1
M 2). A denitive conclusion can be drawn in contests with small
pools of potential participants.
Corollary 2 When the number of contestants contest is small, i.e., M = 2; 3,
r(q^)  (1 + 1
M 2) must hold, and a symmetric equilibrium with pure-strategy
bidding can always be induced by setting r = r(q^).
In these cases, (1+ 1
M 2) > r0, so the condition r(q^)  (1+ 1M 2) is satised
automatically. Nevertheless, it is less certain when M is large. We further check
its robustness through numerical exercises. The condition is found to hold over a
large parameter space, and ample incidents r(q^)  (1 + 1
M 2) can be observed.
Figure 2.2, which is provided above, gives a small sample of these observations.
We observe incidents of r(q^) > (1 + 1
M 2) as well. However, recall that
r  (1+ 1
M 2) is su¢ cient but not necessary for pure-strategy bidding. It should
be noted that pure-strategy bidding can still be induced by r 2 ((1+ 1
M 2); r0].
As aforementioned, technical di¢ culty prevents us from drawing denitive con-
clusion on the property of biddersexpected payo¤ function ~i(xi) when r exceeds
(1 + 1
M 2). Our numerical exercises, however, yield interesting observations.
11In our setting, if entry does not involve xed entry cost, all the M potential bidders
will participate. The conventional wisdom in contest literature would apply, such that r =
(1 + 1M 1 ) would emerge as the optimum.
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We normalize v to unity. The simulation is run over a large set of the para-
meters (;M), which span the entire space of [1; 2]  f4; 5; : : : ; 100g. For given
(;M), we let r vary over the entire range of ((1+ 1
M 2); r0] if (1+
1
M 2) < r0,
and let  vary over the interval ( 1
M
; 1) as required by Assumption 1. We observe
from our simulation results, with no exception, that all ~i(xi) demonstrates the
property depicted by Lemma 4, and is uniquely maximized by x, despite that
r exceeds (1 + 1
M 2). In all resultant gures, the curve is regularly shaped as
described by Lemma 4. Figure 2.3 provides one example of them. The strategy
prole (q; x) constitutes the unique symmetric equilibrium with pure-strategy
bidding in all the simulated settings.

















Figure 2.3: The shape of i (xi) when  = 1:1;M = 10; v = 1; = 1=9
Hence, in all the simulated settings, we can elicit the rst bestby setting
r = r(q^), regardless of the size of r(q^). Based on these observations, we propose
the following conjectures.
Conjecture 1 (a) A symmetric equilibrium with pure bidding exists if and only
if r  r0.
(b) The rst best overall bid xT  can always be induced in a unique symmetric
equilibrium with pure-strategy bidding by setting r to r(q^).
We are unable to prove it analytically. However, all of our numerical exercises
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lend support to the claim. We leave it to future studies due to its technical
di¢ culty.
4.2 E¢ cient Exclusion
The equilibrium analysis also allows us to investigate another classical question
in the literature on contest design. With a xed number n of bidders, a Tullock
contest elicits an overall bid of r n
2
n 1 whenever a pure-strategy equilibrium exists.
The number of overall bids strictly increases with the number of bidders n. A
handful of studies, including Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1993), Taylor (1995),
Fullerton and McAfee (1999), and Che and Gale (2003), demonstrate that a
contest designer may benet from narrowing the slate of potential prize winners
and excluding a subset of contestants. This strand of literature conventionally
focuses on heterogeneous players and concerns themselves with selecting bidders
of proper types. None of these studies involves stochastic and endogenous entry.
In what follows, we demonstrate that exclusion can improve the e¢ ciency of the
contest in our setting despite the potential bidders being symmetric.
Consider our basic setting where M potential bidders are interested in par-
ticipating in the competition. We now allow the contest designer to invite only a
subset of these bidders for participation. The invited bidders then decide whether
to participate in the contest after they observe the rules of the contest, i.e. the
size of r set by the contest designer.
Let M 0 be an arbitrary positive integer. Dene M0 , min(M 0j vM 0 < )
and assume M0 < M . Recall that the amount of overall bid in a given contest
is bounded from above by the rst best xT  (see Lemma 5 and Denition 4),
which can be achieved when r is set to r = r(q^), and r(q^) leads to pure-strategy
bidding. It should be noted that the exact amount of xT  depends on the number
of potential bidders who may enter the contest. Let xT (M 0) be the rst best
bid for a contest with M 0 potential bidders. The function xT (M 0) exhibits the
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following property.
Lemma 6 xT  strictly decreases with M 0 for all M 0 M0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 6 shows that the rst best xT  of a contest strictly declines with
M 0. The result yields direct implications for the contest design: a contest may
have a weaker potential of eliciting bid if it involves a larger pool of potential
bidders. We allow the contest designer to set r strategically. Let r(q^(M 0)) be the
unique solution to (2.13) in a contest with M 0 potential bidders. We conclude
the following.
Theorem 5 Whenever r(q^(M0))  (1 + 1M0 2), the contest designer will not
invite more than M0 contestants.
Theorem 5 demonstrates that exclusion improves bidding e¢ ciency. When-
ever the condition r(q^(M0))  (1 + 1M0 2) is met, the contest designer will get
strictly better o¤ by excluding M  M0 potential bidders from the contest. By
inviting M0 of them, and setting r to r(q^(M0)), it elicits an overall bid xT (M0),
which, by Lemma 6, is unambiguously more than what she can possibly achieve
if she engages a greater number of potential bidders. Our result thus provides an
alternative rationale for shortlisting and exclusion in a setting with homogeneous
bidders but endogenous entry. The logic resembles that on the optimal r. To put
it simply, although inviting more bidders may engage more participants to con-
tribute their bid, each of them would enter less often and bid less (if he enters)
anticipating a more intense competition and expecting subsequently a smaller
share of the rent. Further, more frequent participation may lead to excessive
rent dissipation because of the entry costs incurred, which tends to limit bidders
e¤ort supply.
Theorem 5 shows that the optimal number of invited bidders must not exceed
M0. It provides only an upper bound for the possible optimum, and does not
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pin down exactly how many bidders should be invited in the optimum. When
the contest designer invites less than M0 potential bidders, the overall bid of the
contest can elicit would change indenitely, and the e¢ ciency of the contest may
either improve or su¤er.12
The analysis for a contest with less than M0 potential bidders is beyond the
scope of the current paper, as Assumption 1 no longer holds in that setting. The
alternative context in fact renders an even more handy equilibrium analysis. Most
of the analysis in the current setting would not lose its bite after slight alteration.
However, a general and systematic conclusion on the exact optimumM remains
di¢ cult. First, the optimization problem requires comparison across integers.
Second, bidders behave qualitatively di¤erently across the two contexts, i.e., when
the number of potential bidder is above and below M0. The discontinuity makes
the comparison depend sensitively on the specic settings of (v;), which, in
general, does not exhibit regularity.
4.3 Disclosure Policy
Our analysis so far assumes that the actual participation level N is unknown to
bidders. Firmsactual entry often involves unobservable or unveriable actions.
However, we now consider it as an institutional element. We assume that the
actual participation rate is observable to the contest designer, and we explore
whether the designer can benet from disclosing N , i.e. eliciting a higher amount
of overall bid.
We let the contest organizer commit to her disclosure policy prior to the
entry-bidding game. Upon learning the disclosure policy, bidders enter and bid.
Denote by d the policy that commits to announcing the true realization of N
to participating bidders and by c the policy that conceals the actual N . Par-
ticipants learn N before they bid if and only if policy d is chosen. Under the
12Examples in specic settings are available from the authors upon request, which demon-
strate that the overall bid may either decrease or increase.
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former, the actual number of participants N becomes common knowledge upon
its realization. Under the latter, our benchmark setting remains.
The same issue has also been investigated in other studies that involve sto-
chastic participation. The question is raised in the auction literature by McAfee
and McMillan (1987) and Levin and Ozdenoren (2004). Lim and Matros (2009)
and Fu, Jiao and Lu (2010) explore this issue in auctions and contests with
exogenous stochastic entries.
4.3.1 Equilibrium When N is Disclosed
Under policy d, the analysis on the entry-bidding game is simplied substan-
tially. Each contest after the entry stage is a proper subgame. With N to be
known to participating bidders, each subgame of N -person contest boils down to
a uni-dimensional game. The existence theorem of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)
for uni-dimensional discontinuous games allows us to verify the existence of equi-
librium in every possible subgame.13 We then readily establish the existence of
symmetric equilibria in the entry-bidding game.
Theorem 6 For any given r > 0, there exist symmetric subgame perfect equi-
libria (qd; fxN ; N = 1; 2; :::;Mg) in the entry-bidding game. All potential bidders
enter with a probability qd 2 (0; 1), and play a (pure or mixed) bidding strategy
xN in each subgame with N entrants. Each potential bidder receives zero expected
payo¤ in the entry-bidding game.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As well known in the contest literature, in a given subgame of an N -person
contest, pure-strategy bidding emerges in the equilibrium if and only if r 
(1 + 1
N 1). Denote by x

T (r; t) the expected overall bid in a contest with a
discriminatory parameter r and under a disclosure policy t. We further obtain
the following.
13Under policy c, the theorem for uni-dimensional game does not apply as the bidding game
involves an uncertain number of bidders.
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Lemma 7 Suppose that the contest designer chooses policy d, and r  (1 +
1
M 1). There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in the entry-bidding game.
The equilibrium leads to pure-strategy bidding in all subgames. Each potential






d (1  qd)M NN = ; (2.14)
where N is the payo¤ of an entrant in a subgame with N entrants. In the
equilibrium, the contest elicits an expected overall bid
















Proof. See Appendix B.
When r exceeds (1 + 1
M 1), mixed-strategy bidding arises in subgames of
large N .
4.3.2 Optimal Disclosure Policy under Pure-Strategy Bidding
The aforementioned existing studies in auction and contest literature are typ-
ically based in settings where pure-strategy bidding equilibrium would emerge
regardless of the prevailing disclosure policy. To facilitate comparison across the
two scenarios, we focus on the setting with r  (1 + 1
M 1). Under this condi-
tion, participating bidders would not randomize over their bids regardless of the
prevailing disclosure policy.
The expected overall bid under policy c is simply given by (2.6). We compare
(2.6) with (2.15), which leads to the following.
Theorem 7 For given r 2 (0; (1 + 1
M 1)], we have x

T (r; c) = xT (r; d) if and
only if  = 1. That is, concealing the actual number of participating bidders
allows the contest to elicit a strictly higher amount of expected overall bids if
and only if the bidding cost function is strictly convex. In addition, the resultant
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expected overall bid of the contest is independent of the prevailing disclosure policy
if and only if the bidding cost function is linear.
Proof. See Appendix B.
A few remarks are in order. First, the same result would continue to hold
when the contest designer is allowed to partially disclose the realization of N .
That is, she is allowed to disclose the range of N but not its exact realization.
We omit it for brevity but the detail is available upon request.
Second, our analysis provides new insights on the well known disclosure-
independence principlein auction literature (e.g. Levin and Ozdenoren, 2004),
and contest literature (Lim and Matros, 2009, and Fu, Jiao and Lu, 2010). As
shown in Theorem 7, the resultant expected overall bid is independent of the
prevailing disclosure policy if and only if bidding cost is linear, while it depends
on the disclosure policy when the bidding cost function is nonlinear. Theorem 7
thus provides another incident of disclosure-dependence.The logic of this re-
sult parallels that of Fu, Jiao and Lu (2010) in explaining why concealment elicits
higher overall bid when the characteristics function is strictly concave. Convex
bidding cost leads bidding behavior to exhibit pseudo risk aversion. When N
is to be disclosed, bidders over-reactto unfavorable contests(i.e. those with
large N) by reducing their bids substantially, but under-react to favorable
contests (i.e. those with small N) by increasing their bids less than propor-
tionally. Concealment alleviates the adverse e¤ect. More detailed discussion on
pseudo risk aversioncan be seen in Fu, Jiao and Lu (2010).
Third, the analysis has focused on the tractable case of r  (1+ 1
M 1), such
that pure-strategy bidding always arises. It remains to be investigated how the
prevailing disclosure policy determines the expected overall bid when r exceeds
the cuto¤and pure-strategy bidding does not necessarily arise in the equilibrium.
A direct comparison between the two schemes is limited by existing techniques in
delineating symmetric bidding behavior and the resultant rent dissipation when
r is large. Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1994) demonstrate that rent is fully
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dissipated in two-bidder contests when r exceeds two. Alcalde and Dahm (2010)
characterize the asymmetric equilibrium (all-pay auction equilibrium) and re-
sultant equilibrium rent dissipation in n-bidder contest. These ndings do not
directly shed light on our setting. Furthermore, our analysis is complicated when
bidding cost is allowed to be convex. However, the following claim can still be
made.




principledoes not hold even if bidding cost if linear.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The result imposes a further limit on the scope of the disclosure-independence




M 2)]. The prevailing disclosure policy does play a role in determin-
ing the equilibrium overall bid.14
However, when r > (1 + 1
M 1), mixed-strategy bidding will be denitely
involved in the comparison between the two disclosure policies, which makes it
technically challenging to determine the optimal disclosure policy. Nevertheless,
we next show that from a perspective of contest design, there is no loss of gener-
ality to focus on contests with nondisclosure of number of actual contestants for
optimal design.
4.3.3 A Broader Perspective: Mechanism Design
Despite the analytical di¢ culty in comparing xT (r; c) with x

T (r; d) directly when
r is large, the incompleteness of the direct comparison is of lesser concerns when
the issue is examined from the perspective of mechanism design, i.e. when r is
allowed to be chosen by the designer.
Theorem 8 Suppose that r(q^) (as identied in Denition 5) can induce a sym-
metric equilibrium with pure-strategy bidding under policy c. A contest (r(q^); c)
14Remark 1 is likely to hold for any r > (1 + 1M 1 ).
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dominates any contest (r; d) regardless of r, i.e. xT (r(q^); c)  xT (r; d);8r 2
(0;1).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 8 states that policy d (that discloses the number of participating
bidders) would not lead to more e¢ cient bidding when r can be set by the
contest designer. The logic underlying Theorem 8, to a large extent, reects a
broad argument from the perspective of mechanism design. It should be noted
that the amount of overall bid a contest can possibly elicit can never exceed xT ,
regardless of the prevailing disclosure policy. Hence, when a contest (r(q^); c) can
successfully achieve the rst best, it must (at least weakly) dominate all other
possible mechanisms.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we provide a thorough account of contests with endogenous and
stochastic entries. We show the existence of a symmetric mixed-strategy equi-
librium in which potential bidders randomly enter. We also provide a su¢ cient
condition under which participants engage in pure bidding actions. Based on
these equilibrium results, we identify relevant institutional elements in contest
rules, and we demonstrate that analysis in this setting adds substantially to
existing knowledge on optimal contest design.
While our study is one of the rst to investigate the subtle and rich strategic
interaction that occurs in contests with endogenous entries, our analysis reveals
the enormous possibilities for future studies. Due to analytical di¢ culties, the
open conjectures in Section 4 pose a challenge for future research on contests.
Further, our setting (characterized by common entry cost and resultant sto-
chastic entry) is only one way for modeling contests that involve endogenous
entry. Other examples include the setting of Kaplan and Sela (2010). They con-
sider all-pay auctions with privately-known entry costs. Another possibility is to
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allow for non-uniform but commonly-known entry cost. The setting has not been
widely studied in contest literature. It would lead to a stratiedentry pattern,
under which a portion of bidders with lower costs participate deterministically
while the rest remain inactive. In this case, the cuto¤ type breaks even while
other participants end up with positive rents. The optimal contest rules under




Disclosure Policy in Contests with
Stochastic Abilities
1 Introduction
It has been widely recognized that contestantsincentive to make e¤ort and the
resultant rent dissipation crucially depend on the rules of the contest. Most of the
received rent-seeking literature deals with how a forward-looking organizer im-
plements an optimal structure to achieve a given objective. Early contributions
assume that a players ability, measured by his or her cost of expending e¤ort,
is xed and common knowledge. However, contestants usually do not know the
actual abilities of their rival at the time they make their decision. For example,
advertising rms that are vying for a commercial project are not fully aware of
each others advertising ideas and thus unable to fully assess their relative com-
petitiveness. Consider another example whereby a university is actively sourcing
for new research professionals to join its teaching faculty. Each prospective can-
didate is unlikely to be fully aware of other candidatesresearch background and
capabilities, thus seriously challenging the assumptions of common knowledge.
This paper analyzes contests where contestants have private information about
their abilities, and are observed by the contest organizer. Following Konrad and
Kovenock (2009), a players ability measured by his or her cost of expending ef-
fort is determined as the outcome of a stochastic process. Players with lower cost
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can be thought of as stronger (more able) players. This assumption is reasonable
since in reality, many aspects of a contestants actual e¤ectiveness or ability have
transitory ups and downs, the value of unit cost of e¤ort is not known to the rival
contestants, but are easily observed by a organizer. Similar to research tourna-
ments, the organizer can form tentative judgements regarding a rms ability
based on its research proposal. In addition, in the job market, a candidates
curriculum vitae usually pre-signals his ability to the prospective employer. One
important consideration when designing a tournament with commitment power
concerns the control of information. The organizer should strategically plan
whether the information about agentsabilities should be revealed back to them.
In other words, we want to compare between two policies: revealing or concealing
the abilities of contestants.
On the other hand, most literature on contests design has focused on the case
where the contestants compete in order to win a unique prize. More work needs
to be done because the more prevalent form of contests in the real world involves
multiple rather than single prize. For example, in public recruitment, depart-
ments normally o¤er several identical positions at all ranks to the candidates.
We extend the all pay contest models to allow for multiple (homogenous) prizes.
Our extension can be used at the theoretical level to examine where established
properties of the single prize all pay contests carry over to the more general case.
In the meanwhile, contestants often make costly investment to improve com-
petency prior to the formal competition. For instance, an R&D company may
purchase laboratory equipment, which improves the e¢ ciency of subsequent re-
search activities. We endogenize the distribution of abilities by allowing a contes-
tant to reduce his marginal cost by making technological investment prior to the
contest. Moreover, taking the time and trouble to enter the contest is a major
concern for the contestants. We further assume that potential contestant have to
incur a positive entry cost to participate in the contest. Potential bidders simul-
taneously make symmetric pure-strategy entry decisions so that their expected
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prots are exactly zero. In this way, we endogenize the entry probabilities. The
comparison may di¤er.
The focus of the paper is to study how disclosure policy would a¤ect the
contestantse¤ort supply and rent dissipation. The private abilities of the con-
testants are observed by the contest organizer. The organizer may care about
total e¤ort or rent dissipation. She decides whether to disclose this information
publicly.
Within the auction and contest literature, under disclosure policy, these
kinds of all-pay auction with complete information has been carefully studied
by Hillman and Riley (1989), Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996), Konrad and
Kovenock (2009), Clark and Riis (1998) and Siegel (2009). They characterize the
unique Nash equilibrium and calculate the expected e¤ort of each agent. Espe-
cially, Clark and Riis (1998) extend the complete information single-prize all-pay
auction for multiple (homogeneous) prizes. Moreover, Siegel (2009) provide a
closed-form formula for playersequilibrium payo¤s, and analyze player partici-
pation in all-pay contests. Last but not least, Hillman and Riley (1989) provides
for the equilibrium under an all-pay auction with incomplete information and
concealment policy.
Following the methodology provided by this literature, we nd that concealing
the abilities of the contestants elicits higher expected total e¤ort, regardless of the
distribution of the abilities. For rent dissipation, we nd that the rent dissipation
rate does not depend on the disclosure policy. To check the robustness of our
main results and to deepen our basic analysis, we extend our model to allow any
number of prizes. In order to have a less technical exposition, we focus on the
organizers problem in the case where she can award two identical prizes, we nd
that our ndings are robust in this two-prize contest structure. We then study
the robustness of our results while allowing endogenous ability distribution and
endogenous entry of contestants. We nd that our ndings remain robust to these
generalized settings. Further generalization are taken by exploring nonlinear cost
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function. We nd that our ndings are not robust when cost function is strictly
concave or convex.
This paper is connected to a few strands of economic literature on contests
and tournaments. Firstly, it is inspired by Lim and Matros (2009), Aoyagi (2010),
Fu, Jiao and Lu (2011), Kovenock, Morath and Münster (2010) and Denter and
Sisak (2011). All of these papers study the information revelation on contest de-
sign. Lim and Matros (2009) and Fu, Jiao and Lu (2011) investigate the impact
of disclosure policy on expected e¤ort in contests with a stochastic number of
contestants. Aoyagi (2010) studies optimal feedback policy about agentsper-
formance in a multi-stage tournament. Kovenock, Morath and Münster (2010)
consider the information sharing in a two player all pay contest where rms have
independent values and common values of winning the contest. Denter and Sisak
(2011) focus on information transmission between lobbying groups and the con-
sequences for disclosure policy in general rent seeking contests. Our analyses
consider how disclosure policy would a¤ect the contestants e¤ort supply and
rent dissipation when playersabilities are stochastic.
This paper is also related to the literature on contests with asymmetric infor-
mation. Hurley and Shogen (1998) explore how one-side asymmetric information
over values a¤ects e¤ort levels in a Cournot Nash contest. Wärneryd (2003)
studies a model of a common value contest under di¤erent assumptions about
the information held by the players. In addition, our paper is linked to Fu and
Lu (2009, 2010), who study contest with pre-investment and optimal endogenous
entry in an imperfectly discriminating contest. Our analysis departs from these
papers in that we focus on perfectly discriminating contests (All pay contests).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the general all pay
contest model with n contestants, the unique equilibrium is characterized, the
total expected e¤ort and rent dissipation rate is calculated under both policies,
and the optimal disclosure policy is explored. In section 3, the robustness of
optimal disclosure policy is checked in a general all pay contest model with m
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prizes. In sections 4 and 5, we check the robustness of two endogenous cases.
Section 6 further explores nonlinear cost cases. Some concluding remarks are
presented in section 7.
2 A Model with unique prize
We study a contest with n players. A prize normalized to unity is awarded to the
winner. The competition for this prize is organized as a perfectly discriminating
contest (all-pay auction), in which each player simultaneously expend e¤ort xi 
0. The costs of e¤ort are equal to cixi. Here, ci is the marginal e¤ort cost of player
i. Assume that unit cost ci is an independent random variable that is absolutely
continuous with nite support [c; c] : The cumulative distribution functions of ci
is F (ci) with corresponding densities f (ci). The contest organizer knows all the
information about playerscost.
We assume further that the contest organizer is allowed to commit to her
disclosure policy - either to disclose the actual ability of participants, or to conceal
this information - and announces this policy choice publicly. We denote the
former policy by D, and the latter by C. Nature then determines ci, the actual
value of abilities. The organizer observes this information, and discloses it if and
only if she has committed to a disclosure. The participants then submit their
e¤ort entry simultaneously x = (xi) to compete for the prize.
2.1 Disclosure
We assume that when the e¤orts are chosen, the contest organizer will disclose
each players unit cost to the public; hence, this problem is a perfectly discrimi-
nating contest with complete information, the payo¤ to player i is given by
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i (x1; : : : ; xn) =
8>>>><>>>>:
 cixi if 9j such that xj > xi;
1
m
  cixi if i ties for the high bid with m  1 others,
1  cixi if xi > xj 8j 6= i:
This game has been carefully analyzed by Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye,
Kovenock, and de Vries (1996). They demonstrated that the equilibrium of the
perfectly discriminating contest for given values of c1; c2; : : : cn is unique and this
is described as follows.
Proposition 1 (Baye et al. 1996) The unique equilibrium of n players all pay
contest with complete information is a set of mixed strategies. Assume c1 =
minfc1; c2; : : : ; cng, c2 = min fc2; c3; : : : ; cng. Then the unique equilibrium is for
the two players with the lowest cost to compete as if they were the only two
players. All other players remain passive. And bids are described by the following
cumulative distribution functions:
G1 (x1) =









+ c1x2 for x2 2 [0; 1c2 );
1 for x2  1c2 :
With homogeneous abilities (c1 = c2 = c3 : : : = cn), there exists a unique
symmetric equilibrium and a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. All of the
equilibria imply the same expected payo¤ (zero) for each player, and yield the
organizer the same expected revenue.
This result is easy to obtain because in an all-pay contest, one can interpret
di¤erences in the cis as arising from di¤erences in valuations or di¤erences in
abilities of players to convert an entry into a prize. Dividing contestant is ex-
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pected payo¤ by ci we obtain an a¢ ne transformation of the expected payo¤
given by Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye et al. (1996). Indeed, in our case, ci
plays the same role as the value vi in the current literature as the adjusted-value
1
ci
is equal to vi:
Lemma 1 In an all pay contest with complete information, the total expected
e¤ort for contest organizer is












[1  F (c2)]n 2 dF (c2) dF (c1) : (3.1)
Proof. See Appendix C.
We now examine the expected payo¤ for each player. Take player i with unit
cost ci as a representative contestant and let ec = min fc ig. Then the cumulative
distribution function of ec is 1  [1  F (ec)]n 1 : Player i can get a positive payo¤
if and only if ci < ec: Apply the payo¤ characterization in Siegel (2009), in any
equilibrium of a generic contest, only the contestant with minimum cost can get
a positive payo¤. i.e., i (xi; ci; c i) = 1  ciec if and only if ci <ec: 1







1  ciec i d 1  [1  F (ec)]n 1

dF (ci) : (3.2)
Assume [1 F (ec)]n 2ec is integrable and dene
A (ec) =   (n  1)Z [1  F (ec)]n 2ec dF (ec) ; (*)
which will be used repeatedly throughout the analysis.
1Following denitions of Siegel (2009), with a unique prize m = 1; and initial score ai =
0: The payo¤ is given as vi (xi) = Vi   ci (xi) = 1   cixi. The contestant with marginal
cost ec is the marginal player, his reach er = max fxijvi (xi) = 0g = 1ec : And player is power
wi = vi (max f0; erg) = max f0; vi (er)g =  1  ciec > 0 if ci < ec0 if ci  ec . The expected payo¤ of every
player equals the maximum of his power and 0.
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2.2 Concealment
In this subsection, we assume when the e¤orts are chosen, the contest organizer
will conceal his information about every players unit cost, causing each player
to know only his own unit cost; hence, at this stage, the problem describes a
perfectly discriminating contest with incomplete information.
Take player i with unit cost ci as a representative contestant, let ec = min fc ig.
Then the cumulative distribution functions of ec is 1  [1  F (ec)]n 1 : Player i will
get the prize if and only if ci < ec:
Assuming all bidder other than i adopt a bidding strategy x i(): The payo¤
of player i given as










1  F  x 1 i (~xi)n 1   ci~xi: (3.3)
Player i will choose xi (ci) to maximize his expected payo¤.
Lemma 2 In an pay contest with incomplete information, the equilibrium bid of
each player is
xi (ci) = (n  1)
Z c
ci
[1  F (ec)]n 2ec dF (ec) ;
and the total expected e¤ort for contest organizer is
RC = n (n  1)
Z c
c
F (c2) [1  F (c2)]n 2
c2
dF (c2) : (3.4)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Given ci; the expected payo¤ of each player is given by
Ci (xi;x i; ci) = Pr (ci < ec) 1  cixi (ci)
= [1  F (ci)]n 1   cixi (ci) :
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[1  F (ci)]n 1   cixi (ci)
	
dF (ci) : (3.5)
2.3 Optimal Disclosure Policy
For a contest organizer who is interested in maximizing the total expected e¤ort,
the following equilibrium analysis allows us to investigate the structure of the
optimal disclosure policy. Lemma 1 and 2 imply the following.
Theorem 1 In an N players all pay contests, concealing the abilities of con-
testants elicits higher expected total revenue to contest organizer.
Proof. See Appendix C.
It follows that expected payo¤ (3.2) and (3.5) take exactly the same form,
the following result can be obtained immediately.
Theorem 2 Given the number of participant n, both disclosure and concealment
policies give each contestant same expected payo¤ .
Proof. See Appendix C.
Theorems 1 and 2 indicate that contestantsexpected payo¤s are identical in
the two cases. However, the contest organizer would nonetheless like to conceal
contestants ability to induce higher expected e¤ort. Note that the total expected
e¤ort and players expected payo¤ are both ex ante. Before disclosure policy is
implemented, each player expects to get a positive payo¤ if and only if he is the
most able player, which produces the same ex ante expected payo¤, regardless
subsequent disclosure policy .
Under concealment policy, each contestant has incomplete knowledge on his
competitiveness or lack of comparative advantage over other contestants, thus
leading him to have a positive ex post expected payo¤ and do their best in the
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bidding process. The player with highest ability wins the unique prize with prob-
ability one. However, when playersabilities are common knowledge, competition
is less erce as the ex post expected payo¤ of contestants with lower abilities is
zero, but they also have positive probability of winning since the equilibrium is in
mixed strategies. Intuitively, under disclosure, each player knows his capability
and rivals capabilities as well. Everyone will slack o¤ as weaker player will give
up if he feels no chance of winning, and stronger player will also slack o¤ (do not
work hard) when he see his competitors are weak. Therefore disclosure creates a
distort competition. It is never a good idea to make playerscompetitive strength
publicly. This provide an explanation why cover the information of contestants
abilities can elicit higher total expected e¤ort.







1  ciec i d 1  [1  F (ec)]n 1

dF (ci) ;
where ci is the unit cost of a representative contestant i when there are n   1
other bidders, and ec = min fc ig.
Corollary 1 Ei (n)  0 and monotonically decreases with n  N:




1  ciec i d 1  [1  F (ec)]n 1
=
h




1  [1  F (ec)]n 1 d h1  ciec i




1  [1  F (ec)]n 1 ciec2dec since F (c) = 1:
since [1  F (ec)]n 1 decreases with n; then the term   R c
ci

1  [1  F (ec)]n 1 ciec2dec




1  ciec  d 1  [1  F (ec)]n 1 decreases with n as
well.
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Ei (n)  0 is apparent since both 1  ciec and 1 [1  F (ec)]n 1 are nonnegative.
This result parallels the nding in a standard all pay contest that the expected
payo¤ decreases in the number of contestants as the competition intensies.
Following part of the paper further explores the issue of information disclosure
from three additional dimensions. First, we generalize the disclosure policy in
the basic setting by allowing n participants competing for more than one prizes.
Second, we endogenize the distribution of abilities by allowing a contestant to
reduce his marginal cost through making technological investment prior to the
contest, and endogenize the entry probabilities by assuming that entry incurs a
xed cost to each contestant. Third, an extension that generalizes cost function
to nonlinear form is explored.
3 Multi-prize Contests
Consider an all pay auction in which there are m identical prizes to be won.
There are n players who are ranked according to their abilities. To simplify
the model assume c1 < c2 < : : : < cn and each prize is normalized to unity
V1 = V2 = : : : Vm = 1. The players with m highest e¤orts win these prizes and
everyone can only win one prize. Abilities are draw independently of each other
from an interval [c; c] according to the absolutely continuous distribution function
F (ci) which is common knowledge.
3.1 Disclosure
We assume at the point in time when the e¤orts are chosen, the contest organizer
will disclose each players unit cost to public; In this case, c1 < c2 < : : : < cn are
common knowledge. Hence, this problem is a perfectly discriminating contest
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with complete information, the payo¤ to player i is given by
Pi (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) 1  cixi
Let Gi (x) represent the cumulative density function of player is equilibrium
mixed strategy. This game has been carefully analyzed by Clark and Riis (1998).
They have shown that the equilibrium of the perfectly discriminating contest for
given values of c1; c2; : : : cn is necessarily in mixed strategies and described as
follows.
Proposition 2 (Clark and Riis 1998) There exists a unique mixed strategy equi-
librium of the game in which the m + 1 highest ranked of players bid xi; i =





























i = 1; 2; : : : ;m;
and where




j (1  cm+1x)1=(m+1 k) i = 1; 2; : : : ;m;
where
k = 1 if
1
cl1
 x  1
cm+1
;
k = s if
1
cls
 x < 1
cls 1
;
s = 2; 3; : : : ;m:
Player m+1 bids xm+1 > 0 with probability cm=cm+1: The conditional distribution
68
function of this player is




j (1  cm+1x)1=(m+1 k) :
When there are two prizes m = 2; the unique equilibrium is for the three
players with the lowest cost to compete as if they were the only three players. All
other players remain passive. And bids are described by the following cumulative
distribution functions:

















































































Corollary 2 The unique equilibrium of n players all pay contest with complete
information is in mixed strategies. The unique equilibrium is for the three players
with the lowest cost to compete as if they were the only three players. All other
players remain passive. The total expected e¤ort for contest organizer is


























[1  F (c3)]n 3 dF (c3) dF (c2) dF (c1) : (3.6)
Proof. See Appendix C.
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3.2 Concealment












1  F  x 1 (c)n 1 j   c  x (c) :
Fix agent i; and let Fs (c) ; 1  s  m; denote the probability that agent i
with type c 2 [c; c] meets n   1 competitors such that s   1 of them have lower
types, while n  s have higher types. Hence, Fs is the probability of winning the
sth prize, where s = 1; 2; : : : ;m. We now have
Fs (c) =
(n  1)!
(s  1)! (n  s)!  [1  F (c)]
n s [F (c)]s 1 : (3.7)
The corresponding derivatives are given by
F
0
1 (c) =   (n  1) (1  F (c))n 2 F
0
(c) (3.8)





(s  1)! (n  s)![1  F (c)]
n s 1 [F (c)]s 2 F
0
(c)[(1  n)F (c) + (s  1)]
(3.9)
when 2  s  m:
Moldovanu and Sela (2001) states the symmetric equilibrium as follows.
Proposition 3 (Moldovanu and Sela 2001) The equilibrium bid under conceal-














s (c) is given by (3.8) and (3.9).
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In the special case where there are two prizes m = 2; the contestants with
the highest and second-highest e¤ort win the two prizes.
The symmetric equilibrium of the perfectly discriminating contest with in-
complete information is described as follows
Corollary 3 Assume that there are two prizes, V1 = V2 = 1, and n  3 con-
testants. In a symmetric equilibrium, the bid function of each contestant is given
by xi (c) = P (c)V1 +Q (c)V2 = P (c) +Q (c), where





[1  F (ci)]n 2 dF (ci) ;





[1  F (ci)]n 3 [(n  1)F (ci)  1] dF (ci) ;




xi (c) dF (c) : (3.10)
3.3 Optimal Disclosure Policy
The goal of the contest designer is to maximize the total expected e¤ort (i.e.,
the expected sum of the bids) at the contest. In order to keep the analysis as
simple and tractable as possible, and in order to compare our results directly,
we focus, however, on the total expected e¤ort comparison with two identical
prizes.2 Given the characterization of the total expected e¤ort under disclosure
and concealment policy, we can now compare (3.6) and (3.10) to address the issue
of optimal contest design.
Theorem 3 In an N players all pay contest with two identical prizes, concealing
the abilities of contestants elicits higher total expected revenue to contest orga-
nizer.
2It will become clear that none of our qualitative results change if we allow for more than
two prizes. We leave the analysis of more general environments to future works.
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Proof. See Appendix C.
Theorem 3 shows that our ndings in Theorem 1 are robust in multi-prizes
contests.
3.4 Payo¤ Equivalent
In this section, we further explore the rent dissipation rate comparison under
both policies.
3.4.1 Payo¤ under Disclosure
We rst get the expected payo¤ of each player under disclosure. Assume there
are m identical prizes V1 = V2 = : : : Vm = 1. As c1 < c2 < : : : < cn are common





j [1  F (c)]n 1 j :
Following the result provided by Siegel (2009), only the contestants with
marginal cost ci < c can get a positive payo¤.3








dH (c) : (3.11)

















note that F (c = c) = 1 and H (c = c) = 1 since c 2 [c; c] :
3Applying the payo¤ characterization in Siegel (2009), the payo¤ of player i is given as
vi (xi) = 1   cixi, and his reach is ri = 1ci ; his power is 1   cic : Since 1c1 > 1c2 > : : : > 1cm ; in
this m prizes model, player m+ 1 is the marginal player.
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3.4.2 Payo¤ under Concealment
In the following part, we will get the equilibrium bid and expected payo¤ of each
player under concealment. Proposition 3 has stated the equilibrium bid. Since
c1 < c2 < : : : < cm < cm+1 < : : : < cn; player i will get a prize if and only if





j [1  F (c)]n 1 j :
Given ci;the conditional expected payo¤ of each player is given by
Ci (ci) = Pr (ci < c) 1  cixi (ci)
= 1 H (ci)  cixi (ci) : (3.12)








f1 H (ci)  cixi (ci)g dF (ci) :
Lemma 3 Given ci; both policies give each player same conditional expected pay-
o¤.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Since the conditional expected payo¤s under both policies are identical, each
player will get equal expected payo¤ nally, i.e., EDi = E
C
i . The following
result can be established immediately.
Theorem 4 In multi-prize perfectly discriminating contests, each player will get
identical expected payo¤ under both policies, and rent dissipation rates are iden-
tical as well.
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Note that rent dissipation rate = total e¤ort costprize value =
1  total expected payo¤
prize value . Both
policies will induce the same rent dissipation rate as long as each contestant gets
the same expected payo¤. Theorem 4 shows that our ndings in Theorem 2 are
robust in multi-prizes contests.
Theorem 3 and 4 and their intuition are similar to the corresponding ndings
in the previous section. In all pay auction with multiple prizes, a policy maker
interested in maximizing his total rent-seeking revenues always prefers conceal-
ment to disclosure, while disclosure policy does not a¤ect contestants ex ante
expected payo¤.
The results discussed in the previous sections o¤er a sharp characterization
of the optimal contest design. But to what extent can one generalize our result
in a model when the distribution of players ability and contestants entry can be
endogenized? Also, does the main result continue to hold if a more general class
of e¤ort costs becomes feasible? In subsequent analysis, we discuss the robustness
of our main results to each of these issues.
4 Endogenous Distribution of Abilities
We have thus far assumed that the cumulative distribution functions of unit ef-
fort cost is taken as given. We now consider endogenous distribution of abilities
where contestants can independently make investment to improve their distribu-
tions of types. Specically, the distribution of marginal cost ci of contestant i is
determined by her pre-contest investment i, with investment cost I (i), where
I
0
(i) < 0 and I
00
(i) > 0.
In an N players all pay auction, player i with investment i 2 [0; 1] will have
a corresponding cumulative distribution functions Fi (ci;i) on support [0; 1] :
In addition, the investment cost is I (i) with I (1) = 0; I (0) = 1: It is clear
that contestantspre-investment a¤ect the distribution of their abilities. In our
setting, ability is interpreted as the value of per-unit-of-bid e¤ort cost.
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Consider the following game:
Stage 1: The contest organizer commits to and announces publicly her dis-
closure policy, D or C;
Stage 2: Upon observing the disclosure rule, each player simultaneously en-
gage in technological investment i with investment cost I (i) in order to lower
their marginal costs, so that e¤ort cost with c.d.f Fi (ci;i), and the investments
of contestants are private information;
Stage 3: Nature draw abilities ci, and each player privately learns his own abil-
ity, the value of marginal cost is revealed if and only if the organizer committed
to policy D;
Stage 4: Players bids xi simultaneously in the all pay auction.
The subgame perfect equilibrium in stage 4 is the same as in Section 2, except
that players have endogenized distribution functions of unit cost.
4.1 Disclosure
Without loss of generality, take player i with unit cost ci as a representative
contestant, assume ec = min fc ig. We concentrate on characterizing a symmetric
pure-strategy equilibrium. Assume all bidders other than i adopt an optimal
investment level at stage 1, that is, k = j = D for any k 6= j 6= i: Then the
cumulative distribution functions of ec is 1  [1  F (ec;D)]n 1 : Player i will get
a positive payo¤ if and only if ci < ec:
We rst look for a subgame equilibrium at stage 4. Recall the results in


















1  ciec i d 1  [1  F (ec;D)]n 1
= [1  F (ci;D)]n 1   ciA (ci) ; (3.13)
where A (ci) is dened by (*).
Note that for any realization of abilities ci; Di (ci;

D) is irrelevant with their
pre-contest investment i:








D) dFi (ci;i) :




D) dFi (ci;i) I (i). Therefore, if D is a symmetric equilibrium so-










In this perfectly discriminating contest with incomplete information, take player
i with unit cost ci as a representative contestant, let ec = min fc ig. Then the
cumulative distribution functions of ec is 1 Qnj=1;j 6=i [1  Fj (ec)] : Player i will get
the prize if and only if ci < ec:
We still concentrate on characterizing a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium.
Assume all bidders adopt an optimal investment level C at stage 1. Therefore the
cumulative distribution functions of ec is 1 [1  F (ec;C)]n 1 since k = j = C
for any k 6= j 6= i:
Then the subgame equilibrium at stage 4 is the same as section 2. Recall the
results in section 2.2, a representative contestants optimal bidding strategy is
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given as







Then, given ci, the expected payo¤ of player i at stage 4 is given by
Ci (ci;

C) = Pr (ci < ec)  1  cix (ci)
= [1  F (ci;C)]n 1   cix (ci) : (3.14)
Note that for any realization of ability ci; x (ci) is player is optimal bid-
ding strategy which maximize his payo¤, i.e., @i
@~xi
j~xi=x(ci) = 0: While x (ci) and
Ci (ci;

C) is irrelevant with his pre-contest investment i:
The expected payo¤ of player i at stage 4 is
ECi (ci;






C) dFi (ci;i) :




C) dFi (ci;i) I (i) : Therefore, if C is a symmetric equilibrium solu-















) dFi (ci;i)   I (i). Recall (3.13) and
(3.14), for any realization of abilities, his expected payo¤s at stage 4 are iden-
tical under di¤erent policies Di (ci;
) = Ci (ci;
). Therefore, the optimal




The existence of symmetric equilibrium implies that players will make the
same level of investment at stage 1, the endogenized distribution of abilities are
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parallel under di¤erent policies. Therefore both policies give players equivalent
pre-contest expected payo¤ at stage 1. Given the same distribution of abilities,
however, hiding the information leads to higher e¤ort according to the benchmark
model. Therefore, contest organizer still prefers to conceal the actual value of
contestantsabilities to elicit higher total expected e¤ort. The following result
can be established immediately.
Theorem 5 Consider the symmetric equilibria of endogenous distribution of
abilities, both policies implement the same level of investment and the same con-
testants expected payo¤, while concealing the abilities of contestants still elicits
higher expected total revenue to contest organizer.
In addition, one should note that when  = 1; no one makes pre-contest
investment. F (ci; = 1) = F (ci) ; and the distribution of abilities is taken as
given, similar to the case in section 2.
4.4 An Example
In a two players all pay auction, player i with investment i 2 [0; 1] will have a
corresponding cumulative distribution functions Fi (ci;i) = c
i
i on support [0; 1] :






which satisfy I (1) = 0; I (0) =
1; I 0 (i) < 0 and I 00 (i) > 0:
Under disclosure policy, apply the results in Konrad and Kovenock (2009),
given values c1 < c2; bidder 1 gets payo¤ 1 = 1  c1c2 and bidder 2 gets 0; given
values c2 < c1; bidder 2 gets payo¤ 2 = 1  c2c1 and bidder 1 gets 0.
When 2 2 [0; 1); the expected payo¤ of player 1 is given by











dF (c1)  I (1)
=
2










When 2 = 1; the expected payo¤ of player 1 is given by

























Under concealment policy, with only two players, the payo¤ of the player 1
given as
1 (x1; x2; c1) = Pr (x1 > x





































  I (1) :
Note that xi (ci) is decreasing with ci; the higher cost, the lower e¤ort. Take rst


























































Then given c1;the payo¤ of player 1 is
1 (x1; x2; c1) = [1  F2 (c1)]  c1x1 (c1)  I (1)



























and the expected payo¤ of player 1 is given by
EC1 (1; 2) =
Z 1
0

































The expected payo¤ of each player is the same regardless of the disclosure
policy.












































The symmetric equilibrium pre-contest investment level does exist in this two
players all pay contests example.
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5 Endogenous Entry
In this subsection, we further explore the role of disclosure policy in rent dissipa-
tion. We now consider strategic contestants. Instead of entering the contest with
a xed probability, each contestant makes his entry decision. We assume that
entry incurs a xed positive sunk cost  to each contestant, which is irreversible
once entry decision has been made. One enters if and only if his expected payo¤
in the subsequent contest at least o¤sets the xed cost.
The game then proceeds as follows. The contest organizer commits to and
announces publicly her disclosure policy, D or C. Upon observing the disclosure
rule, contestants simultaneously choose their entry strategies, and each partici-
pant sinks a xed cost  > 0 upon entry. The value of marginal cost is revealed
if and only if the organizer committed to policy D. Participating contestants then
simultaneously submit their e¤ort entries.
5.1 Disclosure
Given the number of participants k, the equilibrium expected payo¤ of each







ciA (ci; k) dF (ci) : (3.15)
At the equilibrium entry probability p 2 [0; 1), every contestant is indi¤erent





k 1(1  p)n kEDi (k) = : (3.16)
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5.2 Concealment
Following the methodology in section 2.2, for each participant i with marginal
cost ci, the probability of k contestants showing up is Ck 1n 1p
k 1(1   p)n k; the
payo¤ of player i is given as




k 1(1  p)n k 1  F  x 1 i (xi)n 1   cixi: (3.17)






(k   1)Ck 1n 1pk 1(1  p)n kf (ci) [1  F (ci)]n 2 =ci:
Apply (*)4














(k   1)Ck 1n 1pk 1(1  p)n k
Z c
ci
[1  F (ec)]n 2ec dF (ec) :
Given ci; the expected payo¤ of each player is given by











[1  F (ci)]k 1   ciA (ci; k)
o
:
4Note that A (c) = 0 since F (c) = 1: And x (c) = 0:
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ciA (ci; k) dF (ci)

: (3.18)
At the equilibrium entry probability p 2 [0; 1), every contestants expected
payo¤ o¤sets his entry cost.
ECi = : (3.19)
Moreover, each potential contestant has 0 expected payo¤at the equilibrium5,
and the expected total cost of e¤ort can be written as
TEC (p) = [1  (1  p)n]  np: (3.20)
where n  2 is the number of potential contestants.
5.3 Comparison
Note that (3.16) and (3.19) take identical forms, then we get the equivalent
equilibrium entry probability and from (3.20) we get the same rent dissipation
rate. Given the same entry, however, hiding the information leads to higher e¤ort
according to the exogenous entry result. Therefore, contest organizer still prefers
to conceal the actual value of contestantsabilities to elicit higher total expected
e¤ort. Then we have the following result,
Theorem 6 When entry is endogenized, both policies induce equal equilibrium
entry probability p(k) and the same dissipation rate, while concealing the abilities
of contestants still elicits higher expected total revenue to contest organizer.
Theorem 5 and 6 strengthen the argument of Theorem 1 and 2. The results
of Theorem 1 and 2 are robust even when an endogenous ability distribution or
5Please refer to Fu and Lu (2010) for detailed interpretation and proof.
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endogenous entry is allowed in the game. It further veries that the expected
payo¤ for each contestant and equilibrium level of total e¤ort cost in the contest
do not depend on whether the contest organizer disclose information, while con-
cealing the abilities of the contestants elicits higher expected total e¤ort, despite
the endogeneity of ability distribution and entry.
6 Contests with Nonlinear Cost
In this section, we will check whether our result about disclosure policy is robust
when cost function is nonlinear. A bid xi costs a contestant c(xi), with c0() > 0
and c00()  0. For the sake of tractability, we assume that player is bidding cost
function takes the form c (xi) = cix

i . We just focus on the basic model with two
contestants and a unique prize.
6.1 Disclosure
We assume at the point in time when the e¤orts are chosen, the contest organizer
will disclose each players unit cost to public; hence, this problem is a perfectly
discriminating contest with complete information, the payo¤ to player i is given
by
 (x1; x2; c1; c2) = Pi (x1; x2) 1  cixi :
Following the method outlined by Hillman and Riley (1999), the equilibrium
of the perfectly discriminating contest for given values of c1 and c2 is unique and
described as follows,
Proposition 4 The unique equilibrium of the perfectly discriminating contest for
given values of c1 and c2 (c1 < c2) is in mixed strategies and bids are described
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Therefore, with general cumulative distribution function F (ci) and ci 2 [c; c] ;




















































dF (c2) : (3.21)
6.2 Concealment
In this subsection, we assume that at the point in time when the e¤orts are
chosen, the contest organizer will conceal information regarding players unit
cost, and each player does not know the rival players unit cost; hence, at this
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stage, the problem describes a perfectly discriminating contest with incomplete
information.
The payo¤s of the player is given as







































Note that xi (ci) is decreasing with ci;thus the higher the cost, the lower the































































dF (c1) : (3.23)
6.3 Optimal Disclosure Policy
We now compare (3.21) and (3.23) to investigate the e¤ort maximizing disclosure
policy.
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dF (c1) : (3.23)
With linear cost c (xi) = cixi; we have shown that RC > RD in section 2.
However, it is possible that at some level where  6= 1; RC < RD:
Example 1 In a two player perfectly discriminating contest, when F (c) = c;and
c 2 [1; 2] ; with either convex cost c (xi) = cix2i or concave cost c (xi) = cix0:5i ; dis-
closing the abilities of contestants elicits higher total expected revenue to contest
organizer.
Proof. When F (c) = c; c 2 [1; 2] ;











































dc1 = 1: 0325:







































Then RD > RC in both cases.
The following theorem regarding nonlinear cost is therefore obvious,
Theorem 7 The optimal disclosure policy depends on convexity of cost func-
tions, when cost function is nonlinear, disclosing the abilities of contestants may
elicit higher total expected revenue.
Theorem 7 reveals that the nonlinearity of e¤ort cost function does a¤ect
the optimal disclosure policy of contest organizer. In the above analysis, we
adopted a power form e¤ort cost function. The analysis shows that the form of
the cost function plays a pivotal role in determining the optimal disclosure policy
of the contest organizer. With a linear e¤ort cost function, a concealment policy
leads to the best outcome in terms of expected aggregate e¤ort, although this
need not to be true when e¤ort cost is nonlinear. Hence the e¤ect of optimal
disclosure policy is ambiguous and no general results can be obtained to guide
contest organizer.
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the optimal disclosure policy of the contest organizer in
a perfectly discriminating contest. The private abilities of the contestants are
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stochastic and they are observed by the contest organizer who decides whether
to disclose this information publicly. The organizer may care about total e¤ort
or rent dissipation. We nd that in a benchmark model with unique prize and
linear e¤ort cost, concealing the abilities of the contestants elicits higher expected
total e¤ort, regardless of the distribution of the abilities. For rent dissipation, we
nd that the rent dissipation rate does not depend on the disclosure policy. We
then develop these results in the context of a tractable two-prize model. While
we believe that our main insights are robust in settings with multiple prizes as
long as e¤ort cost function is linear, we leave the analysis of more generalized
environments to future work.
We further study the robustness of our results while allowing endogenous abil-
ity distribution and endogenous entry of contestants. We nd that our ndings
are robust to these generalized settings. Another natural extension of our model
would be to allow the cost function to be nonlinear. However, the analysis of
this extension would depend critically on the cost function form. The nding
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Appendix A: Proofs of Chapter One
Proof of Claim 1
Proof. When N is disclosed, it is well known that a unique pure-strategy sym-
metric equilibrium exists, and the solution is not di¤erent from (1.4). The analy-
sis is less explicit in the case where N is concealed. We then examine the payo¤
function i(xi; q). (1.7) still solves equation (1.8), but it has yet to be established









 (r + 1)xri + (r   1)(N   1)(xC(q))r
[xri + (N   1)(xC(q))r]3
rxr 2i (N   1)(xC(q))r:









(N   1)(xC(q))r, and negative if xri > r 1r+1(N   1)(xC(q))r. Clearly
r 1
r+1
(N   1)  1 if and only if r  N
N 2 . Because r  1 + 1M 1 , we must have
r 1
r+1


















The above results imply that xri >
r 1
r+1
(N   1)(xC(q))r when xi = xC(q) for all
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= v (xi)jxi=xC(q) < 0:
Hence, xi = xC(q) must be at least a local maximizer of when x i = xC(q).
Since when xi < [ r 1r+1 ]
1=rxC(q), N(xi) > 0 for all N  M , we have (xi) > 0
when xi < [ r 1r+1 ]
1=rxC(q), which means that(xi) increases when xi < [ r 1r+1 ]
1=rxC(q).
Similarly, (xi) < 0 when xi > [ r 1r+1(M  1)]1=rxC(q), which means that (xi) de-
creases when xi > [ r 1r+1(M 1)]1=rxC(q). We next show that there exists a unique





(M   1)]1=rxC(q)) such that (xi) increases (decreases) if
and only if xi < (>) x0. For this purpose, it su¢ ces to show that there exists a





(M   1)]1=rxC(q)) , such that (x0) = 0.
First, such x0 must exist by continuity of (xi). As have been revealed, (xi) >
0 when xi < [ r 1r+1 ]
1=rxC(q); and (xi) < 0 when xi < [ r 1r+1(M   1)]1=rxC(q).





= r(N   1)(xC(q))r
8>>>><>>>>:












[xri + (N   1)(xC(q))r]3
8>>>><>>>>:









[xri + (N   1)(xC(q))r]3
8>>>><>>>>:
(r   2)[ (r + 1)xri + (r   1)(N   1)(xC(q))r]
+
2rxri
[xri+(N 1)(xC(q))r] [(r + 1)x
r
i












= (r   2)x 1i N(xi)
+
2r2(N   1)(xC(q))rx2r 3i
[xri + (N   1)(xC(q))r]4
[(r + 1)xri   (2r   1)(N   1)(xC(q))r]:
We now claim [(r+1)xri (2r 1)(N 1)(xC(q))r] is negative for all xi  [ r 1r+1(M 
1)]1=rxC(q). A detailed proof is as follows. From xi  [ r 1r+1(M   1)]1=rxC(q); we
have (r + 1)xri  (r   1)(M   1)(xC(q))r. To show (r + 1)xri   (2r   1)(N  
1)(xC(q))
r < 0, it su¢ ces to show (r 1)(M  1) < (2r 1)(N  1) when N = 2,
which requires r < 1 + 1
M 3 . This holds as r < 1 +
1
M 1 .
We thus have at any xi 2 ([ r 1r+1 ]1=rxC(q); [ r 1r+1(M   1)]1=rxC(q)) such that
(xi) = 0, (xi) must be locally decreasing, because
@(xi)
@xi























[xri + (N   1)(xC(q))r]4
[(r + 1)xri   (2r   1)(N   1)(xC(q))r] < 0:
We are ready to show the uniqueness of x0 by contradiction. Suppose that
there exists more than one zero points x0 and x00 with x0 6= x00 for (xi). Because
(xi) must be locally decreasing, then there must exist at least another zero point
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x000 2 (x0; x00) at which (xi) is locally increasing. Contradiction thus results.
Hence, such a zero point x0 of (xi) must be unique.
Recall (xi) increases (decreases) if and only if xi < (>) x0 and it reaches
its maximum at x0. Note @i(xi;x i;q)
@xi
jx i=xC(q) = v(xi)   1 and (0) = 0.
@i(xi;x i;q)
@xi
jx i=xC(q) at most has two zero points. Note xi = xC(q) must be a
zero point for @i(xi;x i;q)
@xi
jx i=xC(q) by denition. One can verify that














































M 1  N 1N 5 1 if and only if N 5M .




must have two zero points, and xi = xC(q) is the local maximum point of
i(xi;x i; q)jx i=xC(q) and the other is the local minimum point. Hence, xi =
xC(q) is the global best response.
Proof of Claim 2
Proof. We rst consider the contest with disclosure. When N = 1, the entrant
clearly exerts zero e¤ort. When N  2, we claim that all entrants exert an









). To prove this
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claim, we need to show that when xj = x(N) for j 6= i; xi = x(N) maximizes
i = pi(xi;x i;N)v   xi = exi 1(exi 1)+(N 1)(ex(N) 1)   xi. @i@xi = (N   1)(ex(N)  
1) e
xi




























> 0. Let (y) = y




[y ]2   2 y[y ]3 =  1[y ]3 [y + ] < 0, which implies that @i@xi decreases with
xi. Hence, the solution of x(N) from rst order condition (1.3) is the unique
global maximizer.
We now consider the contest with concealment. We will show that when




















N 1(1   q)M N = 1, xC(q)  x(2) =   1 ln[1   4 q].









, because q 2 (0; 1].
It further implies that (N   1)f(xC(q))  1 as long as N  M  4. We are



















, where 	N = e
xi 1
(exi 1)+(N 1)(exC (q) 1) . We
have @	N
@xi
= (N   1)(exC(q)  1) exi
[(exi N ]2 , where N = 1  (N   1)f(xC(q)) =
1 (N 1)(exC(q) 1)  0 sinceN M  4. Note that exi
[(exi N ]2 decreases with
xi when N 2 [0; 1]. The concavity of @i@xi is thus guaranteed when xj = xC(q)
for j 6= i. Because xC(q) > 0; i(xi;x i; q) increases with xi when xi  xC(q)
and i(xi;x i; q) decreases with xi when xi  xC(q), which guarantees that
the solution to (1.7) constitutes a symmetric equilibrium. The uniqueness of
symmetric equilibrium is implied by the monotonicity of H().
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Appendix B: Proofs of Chapter Two
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let f1(q) = [1 (1 q)M ]v Mq; and f2(q) = (1 q)M 1v . q (> 0)
is dened as f1(q) = 0. The rst order derivative of f1(q) is f 01(q) = Mf2(q) ,
which is a decreasing function of q. f 01(q) is positive when q = 0; and it is negative
when q = 1.
q0 is dened as f2(q0) = 0. Therefore, f1(q) increases on [0; q0], and decreases
from [q0; 1). f1(q) thus has two zero points, i.e. f0; qg, and q0 < q.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Part (a) Existence of symmetric equilibria: Consider the following
extended game. There are M contestants who simultaneously choose their two-
dimensional actions, which are denoted by ai = (ai1; ai2) = (qi; xi) 2 A, i =
1; 2; :::;M; where the uniform action space A = [0; 1]  [0; v1=] is nonempty,
convex and compact.
Let k = (k1; k2; :::; ki; :::; kN) where ki is either 0 or 1. Let K to be the set of
all possible k. Similarly, we can dene k i and K i, i = 1; 2; :::;M:
Given action prole a = fa1; a2; :::; aMg of theM players, the payo¤ of player









j (1  qj)1 kj) Pr(ijk i;x)]v   xi  g; i = 1; 2; :::;M;





















j = 0. Note that Pr(ijk i;x) equals to the winning
probability of an entrant i when the entry status of others is denoted by k i and
playerse¤ort is x if they enter.
Note that this game is a symmetric game as dened by Dasgupta and Maskin
(1986) in their Denition 7. We will apply their Theorem 6* in Appendix to
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establish the existence of symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategy.
In what follows, we show that for each i, the discontinuities of Ui are conned
to a subset of a continuous manifold of dimension less than M as required by
page 7 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). Following the notations on page 22
of Dasguspta and Maskin (1986). Let Q = f2g; D(i) = 1, and f 1ij to be an
identity function. Following their (A1) of page 22, we dene manifold A(i) =
fa 2 Aj9j 6= i;9k 2 Q;9d; 1  d  D(i) such that ajk = fdij(aik)g: Clearly, A(i)
is of dimension less than M . The set of discontinuous points for Ui(a) can be
written as A(i) = fa 2 Ajqjxj = 0;8j = 1; 2; :::;M ; qi > 0; xi = 0;9j0 6= i;
such that qj0 > 0 and xj0 = 0g. Clearly, A(i)  A(i), since any element in
A(i) must satisfy the following conditions: For k = 2 2 Q;9j0 6= i; such that
xj0 = f
1
ij(xik); i.e. aj02 = f
1
ij(ai2). According to their Theorem 6*, we need to
verify the following conditions hold.
First, as constructed above, Ui(a) is continuous except on a subset A(i) of
A(i), where A(i) is dened by (A1).
Second, clearly, we have
P







is continuous and thus upper semi-continuous.
Third, Ui(a) clearly is bounded on A = [0; 1] [0; v1=].
Fourth, we verify that Property () of page 24 is satised. Dene B2 as the
unit circle with the origin as its center, i.e. B2 = fe = (q; x) j q2+ x2 = 1g. Pick
up any continuous density function v() on B2 such that v(e) = 0 i¤ e1  0 or
e2  0: Note that Ui(ai; a i) is continuous in ai1 and lower semi-continuous in ai2.
8a = (ai; a i) 2 A(i), clearly we have that for any e such that v(e) > 0 (i.e.
min(e1; e2) > 0), lim inf!0+ Ui(ai + e; a i) > Ui(ai; a i) as  > 0; e2 > 0 and
qi > 0; xi = 0 in ai. This leads to that
R
B2
[lim inf!0+ Ui(ai + e; a i)v(e)de] >
Ui(ai; a i);8ai 2 Ai (i); a i 2 A i(ai), where Ai (i) is the collection of all ai of
player i that appear in A(i), A i(ai) is the collection of othersactions a i such
that a = (ai; a i) 2 A(i): This conrms that Property () holds for the above
game.
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Thus according to Theorem 6* of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), there exists a
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. Without loss of generality, we use 1(q)
to denote the equilibrium probability measure of action q, and use 2(x) to denote
the equilibrium probability measure of action x.
Next we show that for any strategy prole of players f(i1(qi); i2(xi))g.
The playerspayo¤s are same from strategy prole of players that is dened as



























kj(1  Eqj)1 kj) Pr(ijk i;x))v   xi  ]g







kj(1  Eqj)1 kj) Pr(ijk i;x))v   xi  ]g
for 8i (B.1)
The above result means that given others take strategy (E1q; 2(x)); the
same strategy is also the best strategy for player i. Otherwise, (1(q); 2(x))
would not be the optimal strategy for player i when others take the same strategy
(1(q); 2(x)). Therefore, (E1q; 2(x)) is a symmetric equilibrium for the above
game.
It is easy to see that (q; (x)) = (E1q; 2(x)) is a symmetric equilibrium
for our original game based on the way the extended game is constructed. Ui(a)
equals player is expected payo¤s when he enters with probability qi and exerts
e¤ort xi when he enters, given that other bidder j enters with probability qj and
exerts e¤ort xj when he enters. This claim also holds when they adopt any other
entry strategies with measure fi1(q); i = 1; 2; :::;Mg due to (B.1). According to
(B.1), only the expected entry probabilities fEi1q; i = 1; 2; :::;Mg count.
Note we must have q = E1q 2 (0; 1). First, q = E1q = 0 cannot be an
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entry equilibrium when  < v (Assumption 1). Second, q = E1q = 1 cannot
be an entry equilibrium when  > v
M
(Assumption 1). The expected equilibrium
payo¤ of players must be nonnegative. Thus we must have (1  (1 E1q)M)v 
M(E1q)[ + E2x]  0. This leads to (1   (1   E1q)M)v  M(E1q) > 0.
Thus q = E1q < q by Denition 1 and proof of Lemma 1.
Part (b): The equilibrium payo¤ cannot be negative. When q = E1q 2
(0; 1); we must have the equilibrium payo¤s of player to be zero as otherwise it
cannot be an equilibrium as the player would enter with probability 1 and earn
a positive payo¤.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. If a symmetric equilibrium with pure strategy bidding exists, according
to the rst order condition di(xi)
dxi





N 1(1  q)M N (N   1)rv
N2x









































By entering the contest and submit the bid x(q), every potential contestant
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i ends up with an expected payo¤
(x(q); q) .
By Theorem 1 (b), each potential bidder receives a zero expected payo¤ for
the equilibrium entry q, i.e. (x(q); q) = .














Proof of Lemma 3











)    = 0. Apparently, F (q; r) is continuous in and di¤erentiable with




































N 1(1  q)M N 1 (N+1   N) ;
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v  0 and it
monotonically decreases with N .
When all other potential contestants play q = 0, a potential contestant re-
ceives a payo¤ v    > 0, and he must enter with probability one. When all
others play q = q, a participating contestant receives negative expected payo¤
if he enters by Denition 1 and Lemma 1 ((1   q)M 1v < ), which cannot
constitute an equilibrium either. Hence, a unique q 2 (0; q) must exist that
solves (x; q) = . Each potential contestant is indi¤erent between enter-
ing and staying inactive when all others play the strategy. This constitutes an
equilibrium.
Moreover, F (q; r) strictly decreases with r. Since it also strictly decreases
with q, the part (b) of the lemma is then veried.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Denote ki = xi , k
 = x; t = r

2 (0; M 1









kti + (N   1)kt
v   ki;


















N 1(1  q)M NN   1
N2
tv:
To verify that k is the global maximizer of ~i(ki) given that all other par-
ticipants exert the same e¤ort. Dene pi(ki;k i;N) =
kti










i (N   1)kt. It









(N   1)kt, and negative if kti > t 1t+1(N   1)kt. Clearly t 1t+1(N   1)  1
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if and only if t  N
N 2 . Because t  1 + 1M 2 , we must have t 1t+1(N   1) < 1 for


















The above results imply that kti >
t 1
t+1
(N   1)kt when ki = k for all N 






v (ki)jki=k < 0. Hence, ki = k must be at least a local maximizer of when
k i = k.
Since when ki < [ t 1t+1 ]
1=tk, N(ki) > 0 for all N  M , we have (ki) > 0
when ki < [ t 1t+1 ]
1=tk, which means that (ki) increases when ki < [ t 1t+1 ]
1=tk.
Similarly, (ki) < 0 when ki > [ t 1t+1(M   1)]1=tk, which means that (ki) de-
creases when ki > [ t 1t+1(M   1)]1=tk. We next show that there exists a unique




(M   1)]1=tk) such that (ki) increases (decreases) if and
only if ki < (>) k0. For this purpose, it su¢ ces to show that there exists a unique




(M   1)]1=tk) , such that (k0) = 0.
First, such k0 must exist by continuity of (ki). As have been revealed, (ki) >
0 when ki < [ t 1t+1 ]
1=tk; and (ki) < 0 when ki > [ t 1t+1(M   1)]1=tk.


















[kti + (N   1)kt]3
8><>: (t  2)[ (t+ 1)k
t







[kti + (N   1)kt]3
8><>: (t  2)[ (t+ 1)k
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= (t  2)k 1i N(ki)
+
2t2(N   1)ktk2t 3i
[kti + (N   1)kt]4
[(t+ 1)kti   (2t  1)(N   1)kt]:
We now claim [(t + 1)kti   (2t   1)(N   1)kt] is negative for all ki  [ t 1t+1(M  
1)]1=tk. A detailed proof is as follows. From ki  [ t 1t+1(M   1)]1=tk; we have
(t + 1)kti  (t   1)(M   1)kt. To show (t + 1)kti   (2t   1)(N   1)kt < 0, it
su¢ ces to show (t   1)(M   1) < (2t   1)(N   1) when N = 2, which requires
t < 1 + 1
M 3 . This holds as t  1 + 1M 2 .
We thus have at any ki 2 ([ t 1t+1 ]1=tk; [ t 1t+1(M   1)]1=tk) such that (ki) = 0,



























i   (2t  1)(N   1)kt] < 0:
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We are ready to show the uniqueness of k0 by contradiction. Suppose that
there exists more than one zero points k0 and k00 with k0 6= k00 for (ki). Because
(ki) must be locally decreasing, then there must exist at least another zero point
k000 2 (k0; k00) at which (ki) is locally increasing. Contradiction thus results.
Hence, such a zero point k0 of (ki) must be unique.
Recall (ki) increases (decreases) if and only if ki < (>) k0 and it reaches its
maximum at k0. Note @~i(ki)
@ki
= v(ki)   1 and (0) = 0. Therefore @~i(ki)@ki jki=0
< 0. Thus @~i(ki)
@ki
has exactly two zero points with the smaller one (ks) being the




denition. Since ki = k is a local maximum point of ~i(ki), it is higher than
other zero point (ks) of
@~i(ki)
@ki
which is a local minimum point of ~i(ki).
Note xm = (ks)1= is the unique local minimum of ~i(xi), and note x =
(k)1= is the unique inner local maximum of ~i(xi). Note xm < x. The results
of Lemma 4 are shown.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Dene an increasing transformation of xT (q) :
	(q) = [xT (q)]
 = (Mq) 1

[1  (1  q)M ]v  Mq	
Note that 	(q)jq=0 = 0; and 	(q)jq=1 = M 1 (v  M) < 0 since vM < 
(Assumption 1). We have
d	(q)
dq
= f (q) q 2M 1;
where
f(q) = (  1)[1  (1  q)M ]v  Mq	| {z }
f1(q)





f 0 (q) =Mv (1  q)M 2 [  (M +   1) q]  M:
Note that f 0 (0) = Mv M > 0; f 0 (1) =  M < 0 and f 0 (q) decreases
with q 2 (0; 
M+ 1 ]: Clearly, f
0 (q) < 0 when q 2 [ 
M+ 1 ; 1]. Then there exists
a unique qc 2 (0; M+ 1); such that f 0 (qc) = 0; which means qc is the maximum
point of f (q). Since f (0) = 0; f (qc) > 0 and f (1) = (  1) v   M =
 (v  M)   v < 0; then there must exist a unique q^ 2 (qc; 1); such that
f (q^) = 0. Note that f 0 (q) < 0 on (qc; 1). Clearly, f (q) > 0 when 0 < q < q^;
and f (q) < 0 when q^ < q < 1:
Since d	(q)
dq
shares the same sign with f (q), we have that d	(q)
dq
> 0 when
0 < q < q^; and d	(q)
dq






By the proof of Lemma 1, we know both f1(q) and f2(q) are positive when
q 2 [0; q0] and both are negative when q > q. Thus the zero point (q^) of f (q)
must fall in [q0; q].
Proof of Theorem 4











)  decreases with both q and r. Thus F (q; r) = 0 uniquely denes r as a
decreasing function of q. Since F (q0; r0) = 0 and q^ > q0, we must have r(q^) < r0.
Theorem 3 thus means that contest r(q^) would induce entry equilibrium q^ and
pure-strategy bidding whenever r(q^)  (1+ 1
M 2). Since we have a pure-strategy
bidding, an overall e¤ort of xT (q^) clearly is induced at the equilibrium.
Consider any other r 6= r(q^). If r induces equilibrium entry q(r) and pure-
strategy bidding, then the total e¤ort induced is xT (q(r)). Note that by Lemma
3, equilibrium q(r) decreases with r. Thus r 6= r(q^) means q(r) 6= q^. xT (q) is
single peaked at q^ according to Lemma 5. Thus for any r 6= r(q^); we must have
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xT (q(r)) < xT (q^). If r induces equilibrium entry q(r) and mixed-strategy bidding,
then the total expected e¤ort induced is strictly lower than xT (q(r)) when  > 1,
based on the arguments deriving this boundary in Section 4.1. Therefore the
total e¤ort induced must be strictly lower than xT (q^).
Proof of Lemma 6







































































[ (1  q^(M 0))M 0v ln(1  q^(M 0))  q^(M 0)];
which has the same sign as
 = (  1)
n




[ (1  q^(M 0))M 0v ln(1  q^(M 0))  q^(M 0)]:
Because   ln(1   q^(M 0)) < q^(M
0
)
1 q^(M 0 ) , we have M
0
[ (1   q^(M 0))M 0v ln(1  
q^(M
0
))   q^(M 0)] < q^(M 0)[M 0(1   q^(M 0))M 0 1v   M 0]. Hence,  < (  
1)
n






(1 q^(M 0))M 0 1v M 0] = 0
(by the denition of q^(M
0





dM 0 < 0.
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. We rst show the following claim for a subgame with N players.




, there exists a symmetric mixed strat-
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egy equilibrium for the N player subgame. The equilibrium payo¤ of a player




The proof of this claim replies on Theorem 6 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986).
The application of their Theorem 6 requires four conditions as has been pointed
out by Baye et al (1994) who have shown the existence of a symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium when N = 2 and e¤ort costs are linear. However, when
e¤ort costs are nonlinear and N > 2, the proof is almost identical. Condition
(i) requires that the discontinuity set Si of player is payo¤ is conned to a
subset of a continuous manifold of dimension less than N . Let this manifold be
dened as A(i) = fxjx1 = x2 = ::: = xNg, which has a zero measure. The only
discontinuity point of player is payo¤ is (0; 0; :::; 0) 2 A(i). Thus condition (i)
holds. Condition (ii) of this theorem requires that the sum of playerspayo¤s
must be upper semi-continuous. From (2.2), we have that this sum is v Pi xi ,
which is continuous and therefore upper semi-continuous. Condition (iii) requires
that player is payo¤ is bounded. This clearly holds as it falls in [ v; v] when xi 2
[0; v1=]. Note that a player never bids higher than v1=. Condition (iv) requires
that player is payo¤ must be weakly lower semi-continuous. The only point
one needs to check is the discontinuity point (0; 0; :::; 0). At this point, player
is payo¤ is lower semi-continuous, and thus is weakly lower semi-continuous.
Since all four conditions required are satised. The existence of a symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium is guaranteed by Theorem 6 in Dasgupta and Maskin
(1986).
In a symmetric equilibrium, every contestant wins the prize v with the same
probability, and they incur positive e¤ort costs.15 Therefore, the equilibrium
payo¤ must be lower than v
N
.
We now introduce the denition of a symmetric entry equilibrium. Entry
15Clearly, exerting a zero e¤ort is not an equilibrium.
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d (1  qd)M NdN = ; if qd 2 (0; 1);
dM  , if qd = 1;
d1 = v < , if q

d = 0:
We now are ready to show a symmetric entry equilibrium exists which must
fall into (0; 1).
Note that with Assumption 1, both qd = 1 and q

d = 0 cannot be an entry
equilibrium. The existence of symmetric entry equilibria depends on the existence






d (1 qd)M NdN = . Note the left hand side is
continuous in qd. When q

d = 0, it is lower than the right hand side. When q

d = 1,







d (1  qd)M NdN = .
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. Under policy d, for a given r 2 (0; (1+ 1
M 1)] the subgame boils down to
a standard symmetric N  player contest. Whenever N  2, each representative
participant i chooses his bid xi to maximize his expected payo¤
i = pN(xi;x i)v   xi ;
where pN(xi;x i) is given by the contest success function (2.1). Standard
technique leads to the well known results in contest literature. In the unique



















Note that xN reduces to zero, and N amounts to v if N = 1, i.e. nobody
else enters the contest. Suppose that all others choose a strategy qd 2 [0; 1]. A







d (1  qd)M NN  .
By proof of Lemma 3, (qd) strictly decreases with qd. There must exist
a unique qd 2 (0; 1) that solves d = d(qd) = . Each potential contestant
is indi¤erent between entering and staying inactive when all others play the
strategy. This constitutes an equilibrium.








expected overall bid is obtained as



























Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. For a given r, concealment and disclosure yields the same equilibrium
entry strategy, i.e., qd = q
. Potential contestants are ex ante indi¤erent between
concealment and disclosure. This claim can be directly veried by the proofs of
Lemmas 2 and 7. q and qd solve the same equations (2.4) and (2.14). By Jensens
inequality, 1























Proof of Remark 1
Proof. Fix  = 1. When r 2 ((1 + 1
M 1); (1 +
1
M 2)], the symmetric equi-


















CN 1M 1qd(1  qd)M NN = ;
where N is the equilibrium payo¤ of a participating bidder in a subgame with a






















, because it must be nonnegative by individual rationality.















for q 2 (0; 1). This implies generally qd 6= qc for the given r, which further means
that the total e¤ort induced would generally be di¤erent. Note for  = 1, the
total e¤ort induced is completely determined by the entry probability.
Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. First note that at any symmetric equilibrium when the number of bid-
ders is disclosed, every bidder enjoys zero payo¤. Therefore, we have [1   (1  
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qd)
M ]v =Mqdf+ENE[(xN)]g; i.e. ENE[(xN)] = [Mqd] 1[1 (1 qd)M ]v ,
where xN denotes the equilibrium individual e¤ort in a subgame with N con-
testants. The expected total e¤ort at the equilibrium is Mqd EN [E(xN)] =
Mqd ENEf[(xN)]1=g  Mqd ENfE[(xN)]g1=  Mqd fENE[(xN)]g1= =
[Mqd]
 1
  f[1   (1   qd)M ]v  Mqdg
1
 as   1: Note that the last expres-
sion is identical to the right hand side of (2.11). When r(q^) induces entry q^ and
pure-strategy bidding while the number of bidders is concealed, the maximum
of [Mqd]
 1
  f[1  (1  qd)M ]v Mqdg
1
 is achieved with concealment policy.
Therefore, any contest with number of bidders being disclosed is dominated by
a contest r(q^) with the number of bidders being concealed.
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Appendix C: Proofs of Chapter Three
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. According to the bidding strategy, the expected value of bids for bidder

















And for all the other remaining n  2 players, their marginal costs are above
c2, they will remain passive and exert zero e¤ort.
In a model with n players, there are n (n  1) cases that two of their mar-
ginal costs are ranked as the lowest and second lowest. Therefore, with general
cumulative distribution function F (ci) with ci 2 [c; c] ; the total expected e¤ort
for contest organizer is given as




[Ex1 + Ex2] dF (cn)    dF (c3) dF (c2) dF (c1)

















dF (cn)    dF (c3)

dF (c2) dF (c1)












[1  F (c2)]n 2 dF (c2) dF (c1) :
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Note that xi (ci) is decreasing with ci; the higher cost, the lower e¤ort.




=  (n  1) 1  F  x 1 i (~xi)n 2 f  x 1 i (x0i) dx 1 i (~xi)d~xi   ci
=  (n  1) 1  F  x 1 i (~xi)n 2 f  x 1 i (x0i) [x0 i(x 1 i (~xi))] 1   ci:




=  (n  1) 1  F  x 1 i (xi(ci))n 2 f  x 1 i (xi(ci)) [x0 i(x 1 i (xi(ci)))] 1   ci
= 0:




 (n  1)f (ci) [1  F (ci)]n 2
ci
:
Therefore, the equilibrium bid of each player is
xi (ci) = (n  1)
Z c
ci
[1  F (ec)]n 2ec dF (ec) :



























= n (n  1)
Z c
c




Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Recall (3.1) and (3.4), compare RD and RC ;












[1  F (c2)]n 2 dF (c2) dF (c1)





































[1  F (c2)]n 2 dF (c2)
9>=>; ;
RC = n (n  1)
Z c
c



































c1dF (c1)  F (c2)
























[1  F (c2)]n 2 dF (c2) < 0;
then RD < RC :
Proof of Theorem 2








1  ciec i d 1  [1  F (ec)]n 1

dF (ci) :















[1  F (ec)]n 2 dF (ec)  (n  1) ci Z c
ci
[1  F (ec)]n 2ec dF (ec)
= [1  F (ci)]n 1 + [A (c)  A (ci)] ci
= [1  F (ci)]n 1   ciA (ci) since A (c) = 0; F (c) = 1 by denition (*).
Therefore the equilibrium expected payo¤ of each player under disclosure











[1  F (ci)]n 1 dF (ci) 
Z c
c







ciA (ci) dF (ci) :














cix (ci) dF (ci) :
Note that
xi (ci) = (n  1)
Z c
ci
[1  F (ec)]n 2ec dF (ec)






Proof of Corollary 2





























And for all the other remaining n  3 players, their marginal costs are above
c2, they will remain passive and exert zero e¤ort.
In a model with n players, there are n (n  1) (n  2) cases that three of them
are the three players with the lowest cost. Therefore, the total expected e¤ort
for contest organizer is given as




[Ex1 + Ex2 + Ex3] dF (cn)    dF (c3)
dF (c2) dF (c1)






































dF (cn)    dF (c4)gdF (c3) dF (c2) dF (c1)


























[1  F (c3)]n 3 dF (c3) dF (c2) dF (c1) :
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Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Recall (3.6)


























[1  F (c3)]n 3 dF (c3) dF (c2) dF (c1) :
Under concealment, the equilibrium bid













[1  F (ci)]n 3 [(n  1)F (ci)  1] dF (ci)
9>=>;





[1  F (ci)]n 3 dF (ci) :




xi (c) dF (c)







[1  F (ci)]n 3 dF (ci)

dF (c) :





















































































































































[1  F (c3)]n 3 dF (c3) = R0C ;
where the rst inequality is derived as follows: by assumption c  c1 < c2 < c3 






















































dF (c1) dF (c2) =
Z c3
c






0C ; and we can conclude RD < RC :
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Recall (3.11), given ci;the conditional expected payo¤ of each player































Recall (3.12), given ci;the conditional expected payo¤ of each player under
concealment policy is given by
Ci (ci) = 1 H (ci)  cixi (ci)






























(s  1)! (n  s)!  [1  F (c)]





j! (n  1  j)!F (c)































Fs (c) +H (c) = 1;
therefore















We can conclude Di (ci) = 
C
i (ci) :
126
